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The advancement of complex social systems such as Facebook and Twitter has
led to huge volume of user generated contents, which enable detailed tracking and
characterization of human activities. Users of these systems interact with each other
to make decisions in events such as information dissemination and to learn knowl-
edge such as rating of online businesses. Quantitative analysis and comprehension
of mechanisms of users’ behaviors in these systems are both intriguing and imper-
ative in many academic fields (e.g., economics and social/political sciences) and
applications (e.g., online advertisement and management of electronic commerce).
In addition, due to the high commercial and research values of these user generated
data for many individuals and companies, various data trading platforms are emerg-
ing to facilitate data transactions and to extract remarkable profits from the data
markets, yet few methodological trading schemes are available in the literature.
Therefore, in this dissertation, we are motivated to examine users’ behaviors
during several learning and decision making processes in networked systems and to
design an efficient data trading mechanism systematically for markets with multiple
data agents. Specifically, we first propose a graphical evolutionary game theoretic
framework for information propagation over heterogeneous networks and analyti-
cally study the dynamics and stable states of the game. Theoretical results are
corroborated by numerical experiments on real-world information diffusion data.
Secondly, to incorporate users’ long-term incentives, we propose a sequential game
to model the decision-making procedures in generic popularity dynamics. Proper-
ties of the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game are theoretically analyzed and
match well with empirical observations from real world popularity dynamics such as
information diffusion dynamics and paper citation dynamics. Thirdly, an evolution-
ary game theoretic learning algorithm is proposed for the social learning problem,
where networked agents collaborate to detect some unknown system state. Theo-
retical analysis manifests that the stable states of the proposed distributed learning
algorithm coincide with the decisions of a fictitious centralized detector. Lastly,
we investigate the data trading problem in a market with multiple data owners,
collectors and users. An efficient data trading mechanism based on iterative auc-
tions is presented and we demonstrate that the mechanism converges to the socially
optimal operation point and possesses appealing economic properties. Numerical
studies based on data prices of real-world data transaction platforms are shown to
verify the effectiveness of the proposed trading mechanisms.
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1.1 Background and Motivation
The proliferation of ubiquitous social networks and social medias such as Face-
book, Twitter and Pinterest enables convenient and intimate interactions among
humans. Unlike traditional face-to-face communications, these online interactions
are well recorded in digital formats and the pertinent user generated contents can be
collected and trimmed by exploiting techniques such as web scraping or data crawl-
ing. These large-scale user related data provide us with unprecedented opportunities
to closely investigate human users’ behaviors and more importantly, the underly-
ing complex mechanisms dominating users’ learning and decision-making processes,
which permeate lots of social phenomena. For instance, when a piece of informa-
tion is generated in a social network, the dissemination of the information over
the network is the consequence of numerous online users’ interaction and decision-
making (e.g., should I forward this piece of information?). As another example, in
recommendation systems such as Yelp and Groupon, the ratings of businesses and
products are determined by vast amount of users’ learning procedures based on both
internal feelings and external influences. Quantitative analysis and comprehension
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of the principles of social network users’ behaviors in learning and decision-making
processes are intriguing and crucial in many academic fields (e.g., economics and so-
cial/political sciences) and applications (e.g., online advertisement and management
of electronic commerce) [24].
As most users are influenced by actions and opinions of other peers, especially
their friends, the learning and decision-making procedures often involve competi-
tions and collaborations among multiple agents. Hence, game theory is an ideal
mathematical tool to examine the intricate interactions between the intelligent and
strategic users, whose goals are to maximize their own benefits. Thus, in this disser-
tation, we are motivated to invoke various game-theoretic concepts and frameworks
to study the mechanisms of users’ behaviors in several learning and decision-making
scenarios. Specifically, we address the following issues from game-theoretic perspec-
tives.
• When a piece of information is propagating over a heterogeneous social net-
work comprised of users with different hobbies and influences, every user needs
to make a decision on whether to forward/mention this information or not.
A natural question is how do users learn from each other to make decisions
related to the information diffusion processes.
• When making decisions in the formation of popularity dynamics (e.g., infor-
mation diffusion dynamics and paper citation dynamics), apart from instata-
neous costs and benefits, users may also have long-term incentives regarding
potential prospects in the future. A key challenge is how to incorporate the
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notion of long-term incentives and examine its impact on users’ behaviors in
the system.
• In social learning, networked agents collaborate to detect some unknown sys-
tem state, e.g., the quality of products and services in recommendation sys-
tems. Here, the goal is to design a distributed learning algorithm while re-
specting the strategic considerations of the agents.
Furthermore, the user generated contents, or more generally, big data collected
by any device or system, are highly valuable resources for either commercial goals
or research purposes and are desired by many individuals and companies to per-
form various data analytics. For example, a startup may need some data about
customers’ feedback on its products or services (e.g., click rates of certain websites)
to enhance the quality of the businesses. However, the startup may lack the nec-
essary capability and professions to collect and pre-process these data. Thereby,
it may resort to some professional data collectors (e.g., computer scientists or en-
gineers good at online data scraping) to help collect the data needed or directly
purchase data from some data owners (e.g., social networks like Facebook or mobile
service provides like Verizon who have enormous amount of useful data). Due to
the pressing needs of data transactions in practice, several data trading platforms
are emerging recently such as Big Data Exchange, Data Marketplace and Miscrosoft
Azure Marketplace, whereas no methodological data trading scheme exists in the re-
search literature. Therefore, in this dissertation, we endeavor to design an efficient
data trading mechanism systematically, which possesses both rigorous theoretical
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guarantees and competitive empirical performance on data prices in real-world data
trading platforms. Through both theoretical analysis and numerical experiments,
we demonstrate that the proposed mechanism achieves socially optimal operation
point and economically incentivizes every data agent to participate.
1.2 Outline of the Dissertation
The rest of this dissertation mainly consists of three works on game-theoretic
user behavior analysis [14, 16, 17] and one work on efficient design of data trading
schemes [15]. Specifically, the remaining part of the dissertation is organized as
follows.
1.2.1 Evolutionary Information Diffusion over Heterogeneous Social
Networks (Chapter 2)
A huge amount of information, created and forwarded by millions of people
with various characteristics, is propagating through the online social networks every
day. Understanding the mechanisms of the information diffusion over the social net-
works is critical to various applications including online advertisement and website
management. Different from most of the existing works, we investigate the informa-
tion diffusion from an evolutionary game-theoretic perspective and try to reveal the
underlying principles dominating the complex information diffusion process over the
heterogeneous social networks. Modeling the interactions among the heterogeneous
users as a graphical evolutionary game, we derive the evolutionary dynamics and
4
the evolutionarily stable states (ESSs) of the diffusion. The different payoffs of the
heterogeneous users lead to different diffusion dynamics and ESSs among them, in
accordance with the heterogeneity observed in real-world datasets. The theoretical
results are confirmed by simulations. We also test the theory on Twitter hashtag
dataset. We observe that the derived evolutionary dynamics fit the data well and
can predict the future diffusion data. The results of this chapter are based on our
work in [14].
1.2.2 Understanding Popularity Dynamics: Decision-Making with
Long-Term Incentives (Chapter 3)
With the explosive growth of big data, human’s attention has become a scarce
resource to be allocated to the vast amount of data. Numerous items such as online
memes, videos are generated everyday, some of which go viral, i.e., attract lots of
attention, while most diminish quickly without any influence. The recorded people’s
interactions with these items constitute a rich amount of popularity dynamics, e.g.,
hashtags’ mention count dynamics, which characterize human behaviors quantita-
tively. It is crucial to understand the underlying mechanisms of popularity dynamics
in order to utilize the valuable attention of people efficiently. In this chapter, we
propose a game-theoretic model to analyze and understand popularity dynamics.
The model takes into account both the instantaneous incentives and long-term in-
centives during people’s decision making process. We theoretically prove that the
proposed game possesses a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE), which can be
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computed via a backward induction algorithm. We also analyze the equilibrium be-
havior of the proposed game, which is shown to match well with some observations
from real-world popularity dynamics. Finally, by using simulations as well as exper-
iments based on real-world popularity dynamics data, we validate the effectiveness
of the theory. We find that our theory can fit the real data well and also predict the
future dynamics. The results of this chapter are based on our work in [16].
1.2.3 A Graphical Evolutionary Game Approach to Social Learning
(Chapter 4)
In this chapter, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a net-
worked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private
signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning method
is proposed. In the proposed game-theoretic method, agents only need to communi-
cate their binary decisions rather than the real-valued beliefs with their neighbors,
which endows the method with low communication complexity. Under mean field
approximations, we theoretically analyze the steady state equilibria of the game and
show that the evolutionarily stable states (ESSs) coincide with the decisions of the
benchmark centralized detector. Numerical experiments are implemented to con-
firm the effectiveness of the proposed game-theoretic learning method. The results
of this chapter are based on our work in [17].
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1.2.4 Data Trading with Multiple Owners, Collectors and Users: An
Iterative Auction Mechanism (Chapter 5)
In the big data era, it is vital to allocate the vast amount of data to heteroge-
neous users with different interests. To clinch this goal, various agents including data
owners, collectors and users should cooperate to trade data efficiently. However, the
data agents (data owners, collectors and users) are selfish and seek to maximize
their own utilities instead of the overall system efficiency. As such, a sophisticated
mechanism is imperative to guide the agents to distribute data efficiently. In this
chapter, the data trading problem of a data market with multiple data owners,
collectors and users is formulated and an iterative auction mechanism is proposed
to coordinate the trading. The proposed mechanism guides the selfish data agents
to trade data efficiently in terms of social welfare and avoids direct access of the
agents’ private information. We theoretically prove that the proposed mechanism
can achieve the socially optimal operation point. Moreover, we demonstrate that
the mechanism satisfies appealing economic properties such as individual rationality
and weakly balanced budget. Then, we expand the mechanism to non-exclusive data
trading, in which the same data can be dispensed to multiple collectors and users.
Simulations as well as real data experiments validate the theoretical properties of
the mechanism. The results of this chapter are based on our work in [15].
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Chapter 2
Evolutionary Information Diffusion over Heterogeneous Social
Networks
2.1 Motivation
Online social networks such as Twitter, Facebook and Youtube are ubiquitous
in daily life. Billions of people with different characteristics interact on the social
networks, not only receiving a lot of information but also creating numerous amount
of information. For example, about 500 millions of tweets are sent from Twitter
every day [97] while around 300 thousand statuses are updated every minute on
Facebook [81]. Each piece of information can either go viral, i.e., become very pop-
ular, or disappear quickly with few impact. When the user-generated information
such as memes [70] and Twitter hashtags [27] propagates through the social net-
works, a variety of information diffusion dynamics are observed [114]. The diffusion
dynamics or the popularity of the information are determined by the complicated
interaction and decision-making of lots of users, which involves users’ heterogeneous
interests and influences. For instance, a football fan has a higher probability of
retweeting a tweet about football and a user tends to post a piece of news if many
of his friends have posted it. In practice, many applications are related to the infor-
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mation diffusion over social networks: online advertisements, political statements,
rumor detection and control. All these applications call for a better understanding
of the information diffusion process over the social networks composed of heteroge-
neous individuals. Consequently, great efforts have been devoted to studying how
the information diffuses in the recent decade.
Existing works on information diffusion can be mainly classified into two cate-
gories: i) using machine learning (ML) or data mining approaches to make inference
and prediction; ii) devising microscopic mechanisms to explain the information dif-
fusion from the perspective of the individual users’ interactions. Among the first
category, Pinto et al. used early diffusion data to predict future diffusion [85] while
the community structure is further exploited to improve the performance of predic-
tion of viral memes in [111]. Yang and Leskovec proposed a clustering algorithm to
identify the patterns of the diffusion dynamics of online contents [114]. Given the
information diffusion data, efficient algorithms are developed to infer the underly-
ing information diffusion network in [39,89,113]. Alternatively, the authors in [113]
estimated the global influence of individuals in the information diffusion process.
The interactions between the diffusions of multiple pieces of information are inves-
tigated in [77] while the impact of external sources on the information diffusion is
considered in [78]. Cheng et al. tried to predict the cascades of the information
diffusion [26]. Using the data from a real-world experiment, the authors in [18]
studied the impact of cluster structure of the social network on the diffusion of be-
haviors. Similarly, taking an experimental approach, Bakshy et al. investigated the
role of social ties on the information diffusion [7]. A common limitation of these
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ML or data mining based approaches is the lack of understanding of the underlying
microscopic mechanisms of the individuals’ decision making that dominate the in-
formation diffusion process, which is the focus of the papers in the second category.
In this category, authors in [41] and [101] developed game-theoretic mechanisms to
analyze the competitive contagions in networks, such as firms’ competing for users’
purchase. Under a threshold model, Granovetter studied the diffusion of the collec-
tive behaviors, which are defined to be the adoption of one of two alternatives [42].
Assuming each user played the best response to the population’s strategies, Morris
studied the conditions for global contagion of behaviors [75]. The impact of the
network structure on virus propagation was investigated in [102]. Moreover, in [58],
algorithms for finding initial targets to maximize the future contagions over the
networks are presented. The impact of the community structure on information
diffusion was studied in a model-based approach in [79].
Recently, the authors of [54,55] proposed to use an evolutionary game-theoretic
framework to model the users’ interactions during the information diffusion process.
Evolutionary game theory, originating from the evolutionary biology [98], was used
as a promising modeling tool in various areas of signal processing such as communi-
cation networking and image processing [23,25,53,100,104]. In [54,55], it was found
that the dynamics derived under the evolutionary game framework fit the real-world
information diffusion dynamics well and could even make predictions on the future
diffusion dynamics, suggesting a suitable and tractable paradigm for analyzing the
information diffusion.
Most of the existing works treat the network users as homogeneous individ-
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uals and do not take the heterogeneity of the users into consideration. However,
real-world social networks often exhibit significant heterogeneity. For example, het-
erogeneous aspects of the Twitter network include: (a) A variety of different topics
coexist due to the heterogeneous interests of users; (b) Different users have very
different follower counts, indicating different influences [9]; (c) The distribution of
tweet counts is highly heterogeneous: the top 15% users account for the 85% of the
tweets, suggesting that the user activity strength is heterogeneous [88]. The het-
erogeneity of the users’ interests, influences and activities can have huge impact on
information diffusion. For example, when a piece of information related to football
reaches a user, whether the user is a football fan or not has huge impact on the
decision-making (forwarding or not forwarding that information) of the user.
In this chapter, we study the information diffusion over the heterogeneous
social networks using a graphical evolutionary game approach. Modeling users’
decision making as an evolutionary game, we analyze the information diffusion dy-
namics. Through the study in this chapter, we provide a microeconomic framework
by using a few utility parameters to describe the mechanisms of the users’ decision
making in the information diffusion process over the real-world heterogeneous social
networks. The main contributions of this chapter can be epitomized as follows.
• We propose two mathematically tractable evolutionary game-theoretic models
to characterize the impact of users’ heterogeneity on the information diffusion
over social networks. The two models differ in whether the user type∗ is a
private information unknown to others or a publicly known information.
∗The type of a user will be explicitly defined later in Section 2.
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• For the unknown user type model, we theoretically derive the evolutionary
dynamics as well as the evolutionarily stable states (ESSs). The relation be-
tween the heterogeneous payoff parameters and the heterogeneous information
diffusion dynamics among different types of users is observed. In contrast, the
homogeneous model in [54, 55] has to treat all types the same and can only
give a mean evolutionary dynamics averaged over all types.
• For the known user type model, the evolutionary dynamics are derived and
a relation between the dynamics is observed, which can be used to further
simplify the dynamics. When the users manage to know the types of their
neighbors through repeated interactions, the known user type model charac-
terizes the users’ decision making process more accurately than the unknown
user type model.
• Using both synthetic data based simulations and real data based experiments,
we validate the theoretical results. The good fitting and prediction perfor-
mance on real-world datasets indicate the effectiveness of the evolutionary
game modeling. In particular, our results outperform the homogeneous model
in [54, 55] when characterizing the heterogeneous behaviors of different types
of users.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we formally
state the evolutionary game-theoretic model for information diffusion. In Section
2.3, we theoretically derive the evolutionary dynamics and the ESSs for the unknown
user type model. Then, the evolutionary dynamics of the known user type model
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are analyzed in Section 2.4. The experiments on synthetic data and real data are
presented in Section 2.5. We conclude this chapter in Section 2.6.
2.2 Heterogeneous System Model
In this section, we first give a brief introduction to the preliminary concepts
of evolutionary game theory. Then, we elaborate the proposed evolutionary game
theoretic formulations of the information diffusion problem over heterogeneous social
networks.
2.2.1 Basics of Evolutionary Game
The focus of traditional game theory is a game with static players and the
solution concept is static Nash equilibrium (NE). On the contrary, evolutionary
game theory [98] is concentrated on investigating the dynamics and stable states of
a large population of evolving agents who interact with each other. Evolutionary
game, as the name suggests, originates from the study of the evolution of species in
biology, where animals or plants are modeled as players interacting with each other.
Recent works [54,55] show that it is also a very suitable model to analyze the social
interactions among users of social networks.
A very important solution concept of evolutionary game theory is evolution-
arily stable state (ESS), which predicts the ultimate equilibrium of the evolutionary
dynamics in a evolutionary game. Consider an evolutionary game with a large pop-
ulation of players. Suppose we have m strategies {1, ..,m} an m by m payoff matrix
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U whose (i, j)-th entry uij is the payoff for strategy i verse strategy j (i.e., when a
player with strategy i interacts with a player with strategy j, he will get a payoff of
uij). Denote pi the proportion of players adopting strategy i and p = [p1, p2, ..., pm]
T
is the system state of the evolutionary game. Thus, the payoff of any sub-population
with state q when interacting the whole population with state p is qTUp. We call a
state p∗ an ESS if for any q 6= p∗, the following two conditions hold [98]:
1. qTUp∗ ≤ p∗TUp∗,





The first condition is an NE condition, stating that any mutant (deviation from
the ESS p∗) of any sub-population cannot make the payoff better off. The second
condition guarantees that if deviation remains the payoff unchanged, then within
the mutated sub-population (i.e., interacting with the sub-population state q), the
ESS is strictly better than the deviated state q. This further ensures the stability
of the state p∗. An important issue of evolutionary game theory is to compute the
ESSs. A prevalent approach is to find the locally stable state of the evolutionary
dynamics as a dynamical system ṗ = f(p), where f is some function.
Classical evolutionary game assumes that every two players can interact with
each other, implicitly making the hypothesis that the underlying interaction network
is a complete graph. A useful generalization of the classical evolutionary game
is the graphical evolutionary game, in which the interaction network is possibly
incomplete. In graphical evolutionary game theory [80, 94], the player strategy
update rule directly depends on the fitness of the users, which can be defined as a
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convex combination of the baseline fitness B and the payoff U , i.e.,
π = (1− α)B + αU, (2.1)
where π is the fitness. Here 0 < α < 1 is the selection strength, controlling the
impact of the payoff on the fitness. In the literature of graphical evolutionary game
theory [54, 55, 82, 83], α is generally assumed to be very small and we also make
this assumption in the rest of the paper. The reason of assuming a small α is that
we expect evolutions/adaptations to occur gradually and slowly. For instance, in
biology, the evolution of species takes place very slowly; in adaptive signal processing
(e.g., LMS algorithm), we usually adopt a small step size to inhibit abrupt intense
change or instability. A small α limits the impact of payoff differences on the values
of fitness, and thus reduces the gaps between the fitness of different players, which
slows down the evolution. In fact, later we will see that the evolution dynamics are
often proportional to α. After defining fitness, we can introduce three most prevalent
strategy update rules in the literature of graphical evolutionary game theory, namely
birth-death (BD), death-birth (DB) and imitation (IM).
• BD update rule: one player is chosen for reproduction with probability pro-
portional to fitness. The chosen player’s strategy replaces one of its neighbor’s
strategy with uniform probability.
• DB update rule: one player is chosen to abandon its strategy with uniform
probability. He/she will adopt one of its neighbors’ strategies with probability
proportional to their fitness.
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• IM update rule: one player is chosen to update its strategy with uniform
probability. He/she may maintain his/her current strategy or adopt one of
his/her neighors’ strategies, with probability proportional to fitness.
In this chapter, we adopt the DB update rule. The other update rules can be
similarly analyzed under our framework. In the following, we elaborate how to model
the information diffusion over heterogeneous social networks by using evolutionary
game theory.
A social network can be generally modeled as a graph, with nodes representing
users and edges representing relationships. We assume there are N nodes (users) in
the network and each node has some neighbors with whom it interacts. The number
of neighbors k exhibits certain distributions λ(k) (the fraction of nodes whose degree
is k) in real social networks, e.g. Poisson distribution in Erdos-Renyi networks [34]
and power law distribution in Barabasi-Albert scale-free networks [8]. In addition,
real-world social networks usually consist of groups of users with different interests,
influences and activities. To capture this heterogeneity, we categorize the users
into M types, whereas the proportion of type-i users is q(i), i = 1, 2, ...,M . In the
game-theoretic formulation, the N users are regarded as players. When a piece of
information (e.g., a hashtag, a status or a meme) is generated, each user has two
possible strategies: forwarding the information (Sf ) or not forwarding it (Sn). We
denote pf (i) the proportion of users adopting Sf among all the type-i users and pf
the proportion of users adopting Sf among users of all types. We shall call pf (i)
and pf population dynamics or popularity dynamics in the rest of the paper.
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2.2.2 Unknown User Type Model
In real-world social networks, users often do not know the types of their neigh-
bors/friends. For example, a user may not know whether his friend is fan of a singer
or not. In this subsection, we present a model where the user type is private infor-
mation that is unknown to others. Consider one social interaction where a type-i
user A is interacting with one of its neighbors, a type-j user B. Because A does
not know the type of B, the payoff of A should not depend on the type of B in this
social interaction. Specifically, the payoff matrix of the type-i node A is:
Sf SnSf uff (i) ufn(i)
Sn ufn(i) unn(i)
 .
When A and B both adopt Sf , the payoff of A is uff (i) regardless of the type of B.
Both ufn(i) and unn(i) are similarly defined. Here, a symmetric payoff structure is
considered as in [54, 55]. In other words, when a type-i user with strategy Sf (Sn)
meets a user with strategy Sn (Sf ), its payoff is ufn(i). The reason of this symmetric
payoff assumption is that often disagreement (one with strategy Sf while the other
with strategy Sn) leads to the same payoff to both sides. For instance, if a user
mentions a hashtag while another user does not, then when they interact none of
them can find common topic to discuss and both get the same payoff. The physical
meaning of the payoff depends on the applications: if the social network nodes
are social network users, then their payoffs may be their popularity; if the social
network nodes are websites, then their payoffs may be their hit rates. The values of
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the payoff matrix depend on both the content of the information and the types of
the users. For example, if the information is a recent hot topic (e.g., world cup in
the summer of 2014) and forwarding it can increase users’ popularity, then uff (i)
is big and unn(i) is small. And if a group of users are very interested in that hot
topic (e.g., football fans), then they may have even larger uff (i) and smaller unn(i)
compared to other groups of users. By taking the baseline fitness to be 1 in Eq.
(2.1), we can write the fitness as π = 1 − α + αU (π is the fitness and U is the
payoff). Here 0 < α < 1 is the selection strength, which is assumed very small
conventionally. We note that different from payoff, fitness represents the level of
fitting of a user in the social network. This fitting level contains not only the payoff
obtained from extrinsic interactions but also a baseline fitness which encompasses
intrinsic attributes of users, such as the satisfaction of the social network/website.
Suppose A has kf neighbors adopting Sf , then the fitness of A is:
πf (i, kf ) = 1− α + α[kfuff (i) + (k − kf )ufn(i)]. (2.2)
One can similarly obtain πn(i, kf ), the fitness of A when A adopts Sn as follows:
πn(i, kf ) = 1− α + α[kfufn(i) + (k − kf )unn(i)]. (2.3)
Furthermore, since A only knows the strategies of its neighbors but not the types of
its neighbors, it regards the type of all of its neighbors the same as itself, i.e., type
i. In other words, if one neighbor is adopting strategy Sf , A consider its fitness to
be πf (i, kf ). Otherwise, A considers its fitness to be πn(i, kf ).
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2.2.3 Known User Type Model
Sometimes, through repeated interactions, users may somehow manage to
know its neighbors’ types. For instance, when a user observes that one of his friends
frequently post news about football match, he may gradually know that this friend
is a football fan. In this subsection, we present a model where the user types are
publicly known information. Consider a social interaction where a Type-i user A
is interacting with one of its neighbors, Type-j user B. Here, different from the
unknown user type model, A knows the type of B. Hence the payoff of A should
depend on the type of B in this social interaction. Specifically, if both A and B
adopt Sf , A gets a payoff uff (i, j). If A,B adopt strategy Sf and Sn respectively,
then the payoff of A is ufn(i, j). Similarly, we can define unf (i, j) and unn(i, j).
Take the baseline fitness to be 1 in Eq. (2.1) and thus the fitness of a user
with strategy Sf or Sn is respectively given by:
πf (i) = 1− α + α
M∑
j=1
[kf (j)uff (i, j) + kn(j)ufn(i, j)], (2.4)
πn(i) = 1− α + α
M∑
j=1
[kf (j)unf (i, j) + kn(j)unn(i, j)], (2.5)
where kf (j) (kn(j)) denotes the number of type-j neighbors with strategy Sf (Sn).
The update rule is still the death-birth (DB), as described previously for the un-
known type model. The difference is that now the player knows the types of his
neighbors, hence can learn strategies only from those neighbors with the same type
as his. The notations of this chapter are summarized in Table 2.1, in which some of
the notations will be introduced in Section 2.4.
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Table 2.1: Notations
N Number of nodes in the network
k Degree of a given node
M Number of user types in the network
q(i) The proportion of Type-i users in the network
pf (i) Proportion of users adopting Sf among all the type-i users
pf Proportion of users adopting Sf among users of all types
uff (i), ufn(i),
unn(i)
Payoffs of Type-i users in the unknown user type model.
For details, see Subsection 2.2-B.
πf (i), πn(i) Fitness of a Type-i user with strategy Sf or Sn, respectively
kf Number of neighbors (of a given user) adopting strategy Sf
πf (i, kf ),
πn(i, kf )
Fitness of a Type-i with kf neighbors adopting strategy Sf
while itself adopts strategy Sf or Sn, respectively.
pff (i, j), pfn(i, j),
pnn(i, j)
Relationship states of Type-i users in the known user type model.
For details, see Section 2.4.
pf |f (i, j), pf |n(i, j),
pn|f (i, j), pn|n(i, j)
Influence states of Type-i users in the known user type model.
For details, see Section 2.4.
uff (i, j), ufn(i, j),
unf (i, j), unn(i, j)
Payoffs of Type-i users in the known user type model.
For details, see Subsection 2.2-C.
kf (j) Number of neighbors (of a given Type-j user) adopting strategy Sf
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2.3 Theoretical Analysis for the Unknown User Type Model
In this section, we derive the evolutionary dynamics of the network states
pf (i), pf and the corresponding evolutionarily stable states (ESSs) for the unknown
user type model. The derived dynamics and ESSs connect the information diffusion
process and the final steady states with the heterogeneous users’ payoff matrices
explicitly. We are able to give simple explanations on the ESSs of the information
diffusion from the perspective of the payoff matrix.
Let’s consider a type-i user with strategy Sf (in the following, we will call this
user as the center user). Suppose among its k neighbors, there are kf users adopting
strategy Sf and (k − kf ) users adopting strategy Sn. The fitness πf (i, kf ) of the
center user is given in Eq. (4.11). If the center user changes its strategy to Sn,
its fitness πn(i, kf ) becomes Eq. (4.12). From the perspective of the center user, a
neighbor adopting strategy Sf (or Sn) has fitness πf (i, kf ) (or πn(i, kf ), respectively).
According to the DB update rule, the center user will adopt one of its neighbors’
strategy with probability proportional to their fitness. Hence, the probability that
the center user changes its strategy from Sf to Sn is given by:
Pf→n(i, kf ) =
(k − kf )πn(i, kf )
kfπf (i, kf ) + (k − kf )πn(i, kf )
. (2.6)
Substituting the expressions of πf (i, kf ) and πn(i, kf ) in Eq. (4.11) and Eq. (4.12)
into Eq. (2.6) yields:








k (kfuff (i) + (k − kf )ufn(i)− 1) + (1−
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where ∆(i) := 2ufn(i) − uff (i) − unn(i), ∆n(i) := unn(i) − ufn(i) and in the last
equation we invoke the fact that 1+ax
1+bx
= 1+(a−b)x+O(x2) for small x. Because α is
a small quantity, we will omit the O(α2) term in the following. Since the proportion
of users with strategy Sf is pf over the entire network, each neighbor has probability
pf of adopting strategy Sf . Thus kf is binomially distributed random variable with
probability mass function:
θ(k, kf ) =
k
kf
 pkff (1− pf )k−kf . (2.10)
Hence, taking expectation of Eq. (2.9) (note that k is also a r.v. and we need to
take expectation of it further) gives:
E[Pf→n(i, kf )] =1− pf + α∆(i)
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where k and k−1 denote the expectation of k and k−1, respectively. In the derivation
of Eq. (2.11), we utilize the moments of binomial distribution: E[kf |k] = kpf ,
E[k2f |k] = k2p2f −kp2f +kpf , E[k3f |k] = k(k−1)(k−2)p3f + 2(k−1)kp2f +kpf . In each
round of the DB update, one of the N users will be selected to update its strategy
randomly. The proportion of type-i users with strategy Sf among all the users is
pf (i)q(i). According to DB update rule, in order to have one Type-i user changes
its strategy from Sf to Sn, i.e., for pf (i) to decrease by 1Nq(i) , the chosen user in
the death process should be a Type-i user with strategy Sf , which happens with
probability q(i)pf (i). After that, the user needs to change its strategy from Sf to
Sn, which happens with probability E[Pf→n(i, kf )], where the expectation is with
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respect to the node degree k. Thus, we have:
P
(




= pf (i)q(i)E[Pf→n(i, kf )], (2.12)
where δ denotes increment. With a similar argument as above, one can compute the







= pn(i)q(i)(1− E[Pf→n(i, kf )]). (2.13)
Combining Eq. (2.11), Eq. (2.12) and Eq. (2.13), we deduce the expected change
of pf (i):































k − 3 + 2k−1
)
pf + 1− k−1
)

















k − 3 + 2k−1
)
pf + 1− k−1
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i=1 q(i)∆(i) and ∆n :=
∑M
i=1 q(i)∆n(i). We summarize the theoretical
evolutionary dynamics results as the following theorem, Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 2.1 (Evolutionary Dynamics) In the unknown user type model, the evo-
lutionary dynamics for the network states pf (i) and pf are given in Eq. (2.14) and
Eq. (2.15), respectively.
From Theorem 2.1, we observe that the population dynamics pf (i) in Eq.
(2.14) depend on both the global population dynamics pf and the type-specific
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utility-related parameters ∆(i),∆n(i). Consequently, a connection between the het-
erogeneous type-specific payoff matrix and the heterogeneous information diffusion
dynamics of each time is established explicitly. Additionally, comparing Eq. (2.15)
with the evolutionary population dynamics of a homogeneous social network given
in [55] and [54], we note that the global population dynamics pf evolve as if the net-
work is homogeneous with corresponding payoff matrix being the weighted average
(with weights q(i)) of those among all the types.
Given the dynamical system described in Theorem 2.1, we want to identify its
ESSs. This is accomplished by the following theorem, Theorem 2.2.




0, if unn > ufn,
1, if uff > ufn,
∆n(1− k) + ∆(k−1 − 1)
∆(k − 3 + 2k−1)
, if max{uff , unn} < ufn,
(2.16)










k − 3 + 2k−1
)
p∗f + 1− k−1
)





i=1 q(i)uff (i) and ufn, unn are similarly defined. Recall that





i=1 q(i)∆n(i). Note that it is possible that the system has more than one
ESS.
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Proof: Letting the R.H.S. of Eq. (2.14) be zero, we obtain the three equilibrium
points for the dynamic of pf :
p∗f = 0, 1,
∆n(1− k) + ∆(k−1 − 1)
∆(k − 3 + 2k−1)
. (2.18)
Given p∗f , the equilibrium state of pf (i) can be derived from Eq. (2.14) as stated in
Eq. (2.17).
For an equilibrium point to be an ESS, it needs to be locally asymptotically
stable for the underlying dynamical system. Note that for each i, pf (i) and pf can be
regarded as a dynamical system consisting of two states as indicated by Eq. (2.14)






























k − 3 + 2k−1
)


















k − 3 + 2k−1
)












Since J is an upper triangular matrix and
∂ṗf (i)
∂pf (i)




< 0. Substituting the three equilibrium points in Eq. (2.18)
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(a) Parameter setup 1


























(b) Parameter setup 2


























(c) Parameter setup 3
Fig. 2.1: Evolutionary dynamics under different parameter setups. Parameter setup 1:
uff (1) = 0.4, uff (2) = 0.2, ufn = 0.6, ufn(2) = 0.4, unn(1) = 0.3, unn(2) = 0.5; Parameter
setup 2: uff (1) = 0.4, uff (2) = 0.2, ufn = 0.3, ufn(2) = 0.5, unn(1) = 0.6, unn(2) = 0.4;
uff (1) = 0.6, uff (2) = 0.4, ufn = 0.3, ufn(2) = 0.5, unn(1) = 0.4, unn(2) = 0.2. In every
setup, we have q(1) = q(2) = 0.5, N = 1000, k = 20. The ESSs match the assertions in
Theorem 2.2: some dynamics decrease to 0 (subfigure b) or increase to 1 (subfigure c)
while some will stay at some stable state between 0 and 1 (subfigure a).
into it yields the conditions for the three possible ESSs given in Eq. (2.16), where
we make use of the fact that the node degree k is generally much larger than 1 in
practice.
The ESS results Eq. (2.16) in Theorem 2.2 can be interpreted easily as follows.
If uff is large enough (larger than ufn), i.e., on average the players favor forwarding
the information, then p∗f = 1 is an ESS of the network. The ESS p
∗
f = 0 can be
similarly interpreted. On the contrary, if neither uff nor unn is not large enough
(both smaller than ufn), an ESS between 0 and 1 is in presence. As shown in Fig.
2.1, for different parameter setups, we have different evolutionary dynamics. Some
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dynamics decrease to 0 (Fig. 2.1-b) or increase to 1 (Fig. 2.1-c) while some will
stay at some stable state between 0 and 1 (Fig. 2.1-a). The corresponding ESSs are
correctly predicted by Theorem 2.2. We observe that the population dynamics pf (i)
always vary quickly at first and gradually slow down the varying speed until finally
converge to a stable state. This can be explained by Eq. (2.15). As pf gets closer
and closer to the ESS (be it 0, 1, or some number between 0 and 1), the absolute
value of R.H.S. of Eq. (2.15) gets smaller and hence the varying speed of pf slows
down until it finally equals to the ESS. Meanwhile, when pf is stable, according to
Eq. (2.14), all the type specific population dynamics pf (i) will also converge to their
respective ESSs.
2.4 Theoretical Analysis for Known User Type Model
In this section, the evolutionary dynamics for the known user type model are
derived. It is observed that the influence states (which we will define later) always
keep track of the corresponding population states, which can be exploited to further
simplify the dynamics.
Since a user’s type and strategy affect its neighbors’ payoffs, they may also
influence the neighbors’ strategies. Thus, the edge information is also required to
fully characterize the network state. Specifically, we define network edge states as
pff (i, j), pfn(i, j), pnn(i, j), where pff (i, j) (pnn(i, j)) denotes the proportion of edges
connecting a type-i user with strategy Sf (Sn) and a type-j user with strategy Sf
(Sn), and pfn(i, j) denotes the proportion of edges connecting a type-i user with
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strategy Sf and a type-j user with strategy Sn. Moreover, we denote pf |f (i, j) the
percentage of type-i neighbors adopting strategy Sf , given a center type-j user using
strategy Sf . Similarly, we can define pf |n(i, j), pn|f (i, j), pn|n(i, j). In summary, we
have population states (e.g. pf (i)), relationship states (e.g. pff (i, j)) and influence
states (e.g. pf |f (i, j)) as the network states. Because these states are related to each
other, we only need a subset of them to characterize the entire network state. For
example, we can use pf (i), 1 ≤ i ≤ M and pff (i, j), 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ M to compute all
the other states.
Consider a type-i user using strategy Sf . Rigorously speaking, kf (j) and kn(j)
are random variables with expectation kq(j)pf |f (j, i) and kq(j)pn|f (j, i) respectively.
Since in real world social networks, k is relatively large (more than 100 for typical
online social networks such as Facebook) and a small number of types (i.e., M)
is enough to capture the user behaviors, we approximate kf (j), kn(j) with their
expectations for ease of analysis in the following. This approximation can be justified
as follows. Recall the Chernoff bound: Suppose X1, X2, ..., Xn are independent
random variables taking values in [0, 1], X =
∑n
i=1Xi and µ = E(X). Then, for











. In our case, for a Type-i user with strategy Sf and k neighbors, each
one of its neighbors is a Type-j user with strategy Sf with probability q(j)pf |f (j, i)
independently. Let the random variable Xl (l = 1, ..., k) be 1 if the l-th neighbor
is a Type-j with strategy Sf and be 0 otherwise. Thus, Xl’s are i.i.d. random
variables. Denote X =
∑k
l=1Xi the total number of Type-j neighbors with strategy
Sf , which is kf (j) in our context. Because M is small, usually each q(j), j =
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1, 2...,M (altogether sum to 1) is not too small. Furthermore k is large and pf |f (j, i)
is generally not too small. Hence, µ = E(X) = kq(j)pf |f (j, i) is large. Applying
the multiplicative form of Chernoff bound, we can assert that X is close to its
expectation with high probability. Thus, it is reasonable to replace kf (j) with its
expectation. Similar arguments hold for kn(j). With this approximation, Eq. (2.4)
becomes
πf (i) = 1− α + αk
M∑
j=1
q(j)[pf |f (j, i)uff (i, j) + pn|f (j, i)ufn(i, j)]. (2.21)
Similarly, if a type-i user is adopting strategy Sn, its fitness Eq. (2.5) can be
approximated as:
πn(i) = 1− α + αk
M∑
j=1
q(j)[pf |n(j, i)unf (i, j) + pn|n(j, i)unn(i, j)]. (2.22)
Now, consider a type-i center user using strategy Sf , who is selected to update its
strategy. On average, there are kpf |f (i, i) type-i neighbors using strategy Sf and
kpn|f (i, i) type-i neighbors using strategy Sn. Thereby, according to the DB update
rule, the probability that the center user will update its strategy to be Sn is:
Pf→n(i) =
πn(i)pn|f (i, i)
πf (i)pf |f (i, i) + πn(i)pn|f (i, i)
. (2.23)
The probability that a type-i user with strategy Sf is chosen to update its strategy
is q(i)pf (i). Hence, we have:
P
(




= q(i)pf (i)E[Pf→n(i)]. (2.24)
Similarly, we can analyze the situation where a type-i user with strategy Sn is
selected to update its strategy. And we obtain:
Pn→f (i) =
πf (i)pf |n(i, i)









= q(i)pn(i)E[Pn→f (i)]. (2.26)
We know that:



















For ease of notation, we temporarily denote that a = k
∑M
j=1 q(j)[pf |n(j, i)unf (i, j)+
pn|n(j, i)unn(i, j)] and b = k
∑M
j=1 q(j)[pf |f (j, i)uff (i, j) + pn|f (j, i)ufn(i, j)]. Thus,















1 + α(a− 1)




pf (i)pn|f (i, i)
N
E[1 + pf |f (i, i)(a− b)α] +O(α2), (2.30)
where we make use of the fact that pf |f (i, i)+pn|f (i, i) = 1, which can be easily seen
from the definition. The expectation is taken over k. Similarly, we can derive the












E[1 +αpn|n(i, i)(b− a)] +O(α2). (2.31)








q(j)[pf |f (j, i)uff (i, j) + pn|f (j, i)ufn(i, j)− pf |n(j, i)unf (i, j)− pn|n(j, i)unn(i, j)],
(2.32)
where k denotes the average degree of the network and we omit the O(α2) terms.
Next, we compute the dynamics of pff (i, l) (or equivalently, pf |f (i, l)). To change
the value of pff (i, l), either a type-i user or a type-l user changes its strategy. If
i 6= l, there are totally four situations: i) a type-i user changes its strategy from Sf
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to Sn; ii) a type-i user changes its strategy from Sn to Sf ; iii) a type-l user changes
its strategy from Sf to Sn; iv) a type-l user changes its strategy from Sn to Sf .
They correspond to the following four equations:
P
(
δpff (i, l) = −
2
N
q(l)pf |f (l, i)
)
= q(i)pf (i)Pf→n(i) ≈ q(i)pf (i)pn|f (i, i),
P
(
δpff (i, l) = −
2
N
q(i)pf |f (i, l)
)
= q(l)pf (l)Pf→n(l) ≈ q(l)pf (l)pn|f (l, l),
P
(





= q(i)pn(i)Pn→f (i) ≈ q(i)pn(i)pf |n(i, i),
P
(





= q(l)pn(l)Pn→f (l) ≈ q(l)pn(l)pf |n(l, l),
(2.33)
where in the last step we omit O(α) terms, i.e., treating α as 0. The reason that
we omit O(α) terms instead of O(α2) terms as before is that we have nonzero O(1)
terms here. Combining the four equations in Eq. (2.33), we get (for i 6= l):
ṗff (i, l) = −
2
N
q(l)pf |f (l, i)P
(
δpff (i, l) = −
2
N




q(i)pf |f (i, l)P
(
δpff (i, l) = −
2
N


















































where we have used the equalities pn|f (i, i) = 1− pf |f (i, i) and pf |n(l, i) = pf (l)pn(i)(1−
pf |f (i, l)) in the last step so as to substitute all the influence states by pf |f (·, ·).
31
Similarly we can derive the dynamics of pff (i, i) as follows:
ṗff (i, i) =
2
Npn(i)
q2(i)pf (i)(1− pf |f (i, i))(pf (i)− pf |f (i, i)). (2.35)
Recall Eq. (2.32), where we note that the population dynamics pf (·) evolves
at the speed of O(α). From Eq. (2.34) and Eq. (2.35), we observe that the relation-
ship dynamics pff (·, ·) (hence the influence dynamics pf |f (·, ·)) evolve at the speed
of O(1). Due to the assumption that α is very small, the relationship dynamics and
influence dynamics change at a much faster speed than population dynamics do.
This implies that we can select a time window with an appropriate length such that
the population dynamics pf (·) basically remain unchanged while the relationship
dynamics pff (·, ·) and influence dynamics pf |f (·, ·) vary a lot. In the following, we
focus on such a time period in which the population dynamics pf (·) remains a con-
stant and only relationship dynamics and influence dynamics vary with time. Taking
derivative w.r.t time on both sides of the equation pff (i, l) = 2q(i)q(l)pf (i)pf |f (l, i),
i 6= l, we obtain:
ṗff (i, l) = 2q(i)q(l)pf (i)ṗf |f (l, i). (2.36)
Combining Eq. (2.34) and Eq. (2.36) yields the dynamics of pf |f (l, i), l 6= i:
ṗf |f (l, i) =
1
N













(1− pf |f (l, i))−
pf (l)
pf (i)




Leveraging the equation pf (i)pf |f (l, i) = pf (l)pf |f (i, l), we can further simplify Eq.
(2.37) as follows:
ṗf |f (l, i) =
1
N
(pf (l)− pf |f (l, i))
[
1− pf |f (i, i)
pn(i)
+
1− pf |f (l, l)
pn(l)
]
,∀l 6= i. (2.38)
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On the other hand, if l = i, then ṗff (i, i) = q
2(i)pf (i)ṗf |f (i, i). Thus, from Eq.
(2.35), we obtain:
ṗf |f (i, i) =
2
Npn(i)
(1− pf |f (i, i))(pf (i)− pf |f (i, i)), ∀i. (2.39)
Since Eq. (2.39) is equivalent to letting i = l in Eq. (2.38), we know that Eq. (2.38)
applies to any i, l (not necessarily unequal). Recall that in Eq. (2.38), we treat the
population dynamics pf (i), pn(i) as constants. In other words, we are considering
a small time period where the population dynamics do not vary with time while
the influence dynamics pf |f (·, ·) vary according to the deduced dynamics Eq. (2.38).
Next, we show that in this small time period, the influence dynamics pf |f (·, ·) will
converge to the corresponding population dynamics pf (·).
We first solve the ODE Eq. (2.39) with single variable pf |f (i, i). Without loss
of generality, we assume the initial value of pf |f (i, i) is less than pf (i). Thus, by
solving Eq. (2.39), we have:







where Ci := ln
(










is a constant. From
Eq. (2.40), we see that limt→+∞ pf |f (i, i) = pf (i). Substituting Eq. (2.40) into Eq.
(2.38), we obtain:
ṗf |f (l, i) =
1
N





















Hence, by solving for pf |f (l, i), we have:
ln

















The R.H.S. of Eq. (2.42) is clearly a bounded quantity as t goes to infinity. Hence,
from the L.H.S., we observe that ln
∣∣pf (l)− pf |f (l, i)∣∣→ −∞ as t→ +∞. In other
words, limt→+∞ pf |f (l, i) = pf (l), ∀l 6= i. We summarize the results obtained for
the evolutionary dynamics in the known user type model as the following theorem,
Theorem 2.3.
Theorem 2.3 In the known user type model, the population dynamics pf (i) are
given in Eq. (2.32) while the relationship dynamics pff (i, l) are given in Eq. (2.34)
(for i 6= l) and Eq. (2.35) (for i = l).
The population dynamics evolve at a much slower speed than the influence
dynamics and the relationship dynamics. In a small time period such that the pop-
ulation states pf (·) remain constants, the influence dynamics pf |f (l, i) are given by
Eq. (2.38) (for any l, i). In such a small time period, each influence state pf |f (l, i)
will converge to the corresponding fixed population state pf (l).
According to Theorem 2.3, since the influence state will keep track of the
corresponding population state, we can make the approximation that pf |f (l, i) =
pf (l),∀l, i. Thus, the population dynamics can be further simplified into the follow-
ing form.
Corollary 2.1 In the known user type model, the population dynamics pf (i) for











In this section, we implement synthetic data as well as real data experiments
to verify the theoretical results on information diffusion dynamics and ESSs. First,
using synthetic data, we show that the simulations match the theoretical findings
well. Then, using real data, we find that the theoretical dynamics also fit the real-
world information diffusion dynamics well and can even make predictions for the
future diffusion dynamics.
2.5.1 Synthetic Data Experiments
In this subsection, we conduct simulations to validate the theoretical evolu-
tionary dynamics and ESSs. We set M = 2, i.e., the network consists of two types
of users. We synthesize a constant degree network, i.e., all the nodes have the
same degree (k is a deterministic constant). We first consider the unknown user
type model. The payoff parameters of the two types of players are set as following:
uff (1) = 0.4, uff (2) = 0.2, ufn(1) = 0.6, ufn(2) = 0.4, unn(1) = 0.3, unn(2) = 0.5.
Other parameters are N = 1000, k = 20, q(1) = q(2) = 0.5, α = 0.05. The result
is reported in Fig 4.1. The theoretical dynamics match the simulation dynamics
well and the theoretical ESSs are near the simulated ESSs with average relative
ESS error† 3.54%. If we model the heterogeneous network as a homogeneous one
†The average relative ESS error is calculated as follows. We denote these two simulated ESSs
(for two different types, respectively) as x1 and x2. We denote the two theoretical ESSs as y1 and
y2. Then the average relative ESS error is
1
2 (|y1 − x1|/x1 + |y2 − x2|/x2). If we use homogeneous
network to model, we only have one global theoretical ESS z. In such a case, the average relative
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like in [54, 55], i.e., all the payoffs are set to be the average over all types, then the
average relative ESS error is 6.83%, indicating the advantage of the proposed hetero-
geneous model. In addition, we simulate the evolutionary dynamics under another
utility parameter setup in Fig. 2.3 and observe that the simulated dynamics still
match well with the theoretical ones. Furthermore, to manifest the extreme ESSs
highlighted in Theorem 2.2, i.e., ESSs of 0 and 1, we alter the utility parameters
to simulate and the results are shown in Fig. 2.4, where population dynamics with
ESSs of 0 and 1 are exhibited, respectively. We observe that the theoretical dynam-
ics again match well with the simulated ones. Simulation results for Erdos-Renyi
network [34] and Barabasi-Albert network [8] with the same parameter setup are
shown in Fig. 2.5-(a),(b) respectively. The population dynamics is very similar
to that of the constant degree network, and the theoretical dynamics still fit the
simulated one well. In Fig. 2.6, we simulate the information diffusion of a heteroge-
neous network with three types of users. We observe that the theoretical dynamics
still match well with the simulated ones. All of the above results demonstrate the
effectiveness and accuracy of the proposed heterogeneous network theory.
Next, we implement a simulation for the known user type model with payoff
parameters randomly chosen as follows:
ESS error is computed as 12 (|z − x1|/x1 + |z − x2|/x2).
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Figure 2.2: Simulation results of the evolution dynamics for the unknown user
type model. The theoretical dynamics fit the simulation dynamics well and the
ESSs are predicted accurately. The average relative ESS error of the heterogeneous
model is 3.54%. If we model the entire network as a homogeneous one as in [54,
55], the average relative ESS error becomes 6.83%, indicating the advantage of the
heterogeneous model in this chapter.
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Figure 2.3: Simulation results of evolution dynamics for the unknown user type
model with another utility parameter setup: uff (1) = 0.5, uff (2) = 0.1, ufn(1) =
0.8, ufn(2) = 0.5, unn(1) = 0.1, unn(2) = 0.3. We observe that the simulated
dynamics still match well with the theoretical ones.






























(a) Population dynamics with ESS of 0





























(b) Population dynamics with ESS of 1
Fig. 2.4: Simulations for unknown user type model: population dynamics wit ESSs of
0 and 1, respectively. In (a), the utility parameters are: uff (1) = 0.4, uff (2) = 0.2,
ufn(1) = 0.3, ufn(2) = 0.5, unn(1) = 0.6, unn(2) = 0.4. In (b), the utility parameters are:
uff (1) = 0.6, uff (2) = 0.4, ufn(1) = 0.3, ufn(2) = 0.5, unn(1) = 0.4, unn(2) = 0.2.
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Fig. 2.5: More simulations of the evolutionary dynamics for the unknown user type model
with different networks.





























Figure 2.6: Simulation results for unknown user type model with three types of


















The other parameters are N = 1000, k = 20, q(1) = 0.5518, q(2) = 0.4482, α =
0.05. The simulated and theoretical population dynamics are shown in Fig. 2.7,
where the known user type model based theoretical dynamics and the simulated
dynamics match well. In Fig. 2.7, we also plot the evolutionary dynamics given
by the theory of the unknown user type model. This does not match the simulated
evolutionary dynamics under the known user type model, indicating the necessity of
the theory of the known user type model. Simulations under two different parameter
setups are shown in Fig. 2.8, where the theoretical dynamics and the simulated













































type 1: known type theory
type 2: known type theory
type 1: unknown type theory
type 2: unknown type theory
Figure 2.7: Simulation of evolutionary dynamics: the known user type model.
















In Fig. 2.8-(b), we observe some oscillations of the simulated dynamics. The reason
may be that the number of parameters in the known user type model is relatively
large and the strategy update rule is more complicated than the unknown user type
model, which may lead to unstable behaviors of the users.
2.5.2 Real Data Experiments
In this subsection, we use the Twitter hashtag dataset in [111] to validate
the theory. The dataset, comprising sequences of adopters and timestamps for the
observed hashtags, is based on sampled public tweets from March 24, 2012 to April
25, 2012. To characterize the heterogeneity of the users, we classify the users into two
41





































(a) Parameter setup 1


































(b) Parameter setup 2
Fig. 2.8: Known user type model: more simulations of the evolutionary dynamics with
different parameter setups.
types. The classification is based on the users’ activity. Specifically, we compute the
number of hashtags each user has mentioned. Then, the top 10% users with highest
number of hashtag mentioning are categorized as Type-1 users while the remaining
users are categorized as Type-2 ones. After classification, the number of type-1
users is 62757 while that of type-2 users is 533262. We set k to be 100, a typical
number of neighbors/friends in social networks. Since the dataset does not contain
the network structure of the users, we postulate the network to be a constant degree
network where each user has the same degree k = 100. The selection strength α
is not important in the curve fitting/prediction process, since it can be absorbed
into the payoff parameters as it always multiplies with all the payoff parameters.
In our dataset, the physical unit of time indices is not specified. In the following
experiments, we choose appropriate time slot length so that (i) the data dynamics
are smooth (so the time slot length cannot be too small), (ii) the data dynamics
vary continuously and can correctly reflect the variation of the diffusion dynamics
of real data (so the time slot length cannot be too large).
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Fig. 2.9: Fitting results for the unknown user type model. Type-1 users are always more
active than type-2 users because pf (1) is always larger than pf (2). The proposed the-
oretical dynamics fit the information diffusion dynamics of the real-world heterogeneous
social networks well, which validates the effectiveness of considering the individuals’ in-
teractions. The theory suggests that the heterogeneous behavior dynamics of online users
are consequences of their heterogeneous payoff structures.
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real data type 1
real data type 2
(a) #ididnttextback
























real data type 1
real data type 2
(b) #imhappywhen
Fig. 2.10: Fitting results for the unknown user type model. Two less popular hashtags,
#ididnttextback and #imhappywhen, are fitted. The fitting is still accurate though the
data become more noisy as these two hashtags are less popular.
We first fit the theoretical dynamics for the unknown user type model in Eq.
(2.14) and Eq. (2.15) with the real data. We use the real data to estimate the
parameters (i.e., ∆(i) and ∆n(i)) in Eq. (2.14) and Eq. (2.15), and then calculate
the theoretical dynamics based on the estimated parameters. We invoke the Matlab
function lsqcurvefit to implement the curve fitting, or in other words, to estimate
the payoff parameters. The parameter estimation process is built inside this Matlab
function. Given data and a function to be fit, lsqcurvefit selects the optimal
parameters in order to minimize the squared fitting error. The fitting results for
four popular hashtags are reported in Fig. 2.9. Type-1 users are more active than
type-2 users since the population state pf (1) is always larger than pf (2). We ob-
serve that the proposed theoretical dynamics fit the real-world information diffusion
dynamics well, indicating the effectiveness of taking the heterogeneous users’ inter-
actions and decision making into account. In the curve fitting of the dynamics of
the hashtag #ThoughtsDuringSchool, the utility parameters are estimated to sat-
isfy: uff (1)− ufn(1) = −3.32, unn(1)− ufn(1) = −0.578, uff (2)− ufn(2) = −0.64,
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(a) Using data up to time 22









































(b) Using data up to time 41
Fig. 2.11: Predictions. The heterogeneous game-theoretic model can predict future dif-
fusion dynamics. The predictions made by the heterogeneous model outperforms that of
the homogeneous one in [54].
unn(2) − ufn(2) = −0.004. From these relationships, we see that for real-world
information diffusion data, the estimated utility parameters satisfy the condition
ūfn > max{ūff , ūnn}. From Theorem 2.2, we see that this condition leads to an
ESS between 0 and 1, which is clearly the case in most real-world applications. In
the previous subsection on simulations, the utility parameters are also chosen in
compliance with this condition (e.g., Fig.3 and Fig. 4) and are hence justified by
the real data. Furthermore, we see that unn(1) is much smaller than ufn(1) while
unn(2) is basically the same as ufn(2). To some extent, this explains why Type-1
users are more active than Type-2 users. Furthermore, we fit two less popular hash-
tags #ididnttextback and #imhappywhen (with peak mention counts about 1/6 of
that of the hashtag #ThougtsDuringSchool). The results are reported in Fig. 2.10
from which we observe that the fitting is still accurate though the data become
more noisy as these two hashtags are less popular, indicating the robustness of our
approach.
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(a) Using data up to time 26





































(b) Using data up to time 28





































(c) Using data up to time 30
Fig. 2.12: Predictions for Twitter hashtag #ThoughtsDuringSchool.










































(a) Using data up to time 36






































(b) Using data up to time 38






































(c) Using data up to time 40
Fig. 2.13: Predictions for Twitter hashtag #YouGetMajorPointsIf.
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(a) [106], #ThoughtsDuringSchool, using
data up to time 28







































(b) [70], #ThoughtsDuringSchool, using
data up to time 28







































(c) [106], #YouGetMajorPointsIf, using
data up to time 38




































(d) [70], #YouGetMajorPointsIf, using data
up to time 38
Fig. 2.14: Prediction results of [106] and [70]. Comparisons subfigures (a)(b) with Fig.
2.12-(b) and subfigures (c)(d) with Fig. 2.13-(b) highlight the advantage of the proposed
game-theoretic approach. In particular, the results in subfigures (b)(c)(d) fail to give
meaningful predictions.
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In addition, we conduct experiments on the prediction of future diffusion dy-
namics. Specifically, we only use part of the data to train the payoff parameters
in Eq. (2.14), Eq. (2.15), and use the trained parameters to predict future diffu-
sion dynamics. To compare with the homogeneous model in [54,55], we also model
the heterogeneous network as a homogeneous one and use the homogeneous net-
work theory in [54] to make predictions, which serve as benchmarks. The prediction
results for one popular hashtag #WhenIwasLittle are shown in Fig. 2.11. Two
different training data lengths are investigated. The heterogeneous game-theoretic
model can predict the future diffusion dynamics well. In contrast, by modeling the
network as a homogeneous one, the prediction does not match the real data well,
especially for type-1 users. The reason is that the prediction made by the homo-
geneous model can be thought of as a prediction of the overall diffusion dynamics
averaged over the two types. But, type-1 users are active minority (10% of all the
users). So, its diffusion dynamic is far from the average one and is poorly predicted.
The prediction results of two other Twitter hashtags #ThoughtsDuringSchool and
#YouGetMajorPointsIf are shown in Fig. 2.12 and Fig. 2.13, respectively. For
both hashtags, the prediction performance of our heterogeneous model is good. In
addition, we perform predictions for future 10 time slots immediately after the peak
of the diffusion dynamics is observed for the 8 most popular hashtags in the dataset.
The average relative error of the heterogeneous game model is 23% while that of
the homogeneous game model in [54] is 47%. Furthermore, prediction results of the
existing methods in [106] and [70] are reported in Fig. 2.14. Comparison with the
corresponding prediction results of the proposed approach in Fig. 2.12-(b) and Fig.
48



















































































































































Fig. 2.15: Fitting results of the known user type model for the four popular Twitter
hashtags.
2.13-(b) demonstrate the advantage of the proposed game-theoretic approach.
Lastly, we fit the theoretical dynamics of the known user type model with
the real data of the four popular Twitter hashtags. As shown in Fig. 2.15, the
theoretical dynamics fit the real data well. However, the prediction performance of
the known user type model is not stable, as shown in Fig. 2.16. The reason may be
that the known user type model involves more parameters and the observed data
quality is not high enough to estimate them accurately.
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Fig. 2.16: Known user type model: prediction results for various Twitter hashtags. The
prediction performance of the known user type model is not stable. Sometimes, it is
accurate (subfigures (a) and (b)) while sometimes not (subfigures (c) and (d)).
2.6 Summary
From the real data experiments, we see that sometimes the known user type
model cannot predict the future dynamics of information diffusion well. We ascribe
this to the quality of the data, i.e., the time resolution of the data is not good enough
or equivalently the data is not smooth enough when we narrow the time window,
since the known user type model involves more parameters than the unknown user
type model and needs better data to estimate all the parameters accurately. Another
reason is that unlike Facebook, in Twitter network (from which the data are col-
lected), users often follow celebrities rather than acquaintances, which implies that
Twitter users may not know their friends’ types very well. Hence, the known user
type model may not fit the Twitter network well. But, in the corresponding simu-
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lations, since the setup is just the known user type model, the theoretical dynamics
still match the simulated ones well, demonstrating the theory itself is accurate.
Overall, we present an evolutionary game-theoretic framework to analyze the
information diffusion over the heterogeneous social networks. The theoretical re-
sults fit and predict the information diffusion data generated by real-world social
networks well, confirming the effectiveness of the heterogeneous game-theoretic mod-
eling approach. The derived evolutionary dynamics can be absorbed to improve the
state-of-art machine learning based method in the literature of information diffusion.
More importantly, with a few parameters, our model gives a game-theoretic inter-
pretation to the mechanism of the individuals’ decision-making in the information
diffusion process over the heterogeneous social networks.
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Chapter 3
Understanding Popularity Dynamics: Decision-Making with
Long-Term Incentives
3.1 Motivation
In the big data era nowadays, people not only read lots of data but also
create vast amount of data everyday through interactions. For instance, Twitter
users may mention or retweet a hashtag; Youtube users can like or dislike a video;
researchers may quote keywords in papers. All of these interactions lead to a notion
of popularity dynamics such as: Twitter hashtags’ mention count dynamics and
research keywords’ quotation dynamics. The popularity dynamics can describe and
track people’s interactions with different types of items. In general, people can
only pay limited attention to a limited number of items. When the number of
items are growing drastically, they can only focus on certain items of their great
interest. Meanwhile, in the real world, some items go viral, i.e., appealing to lots of
interactions and attentions from people, while most items diminish quickly without
any impact. To manage and utilize people’s valuable interactions and attention
better, it is crucial to understand the underlying mechanisms of the popularity
dynamics and thus explain the reason why some items are so successful while others
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aren’t.
The process of the generation of popularity dynamics is complicated and in-
volves the decision-making of many individuals. Individual’s decision is influenced
by many factors including the quality and timeliness of the item, the personal pref-
erence of the individual and others’ decisions. An example of Twitter hashtag is
illustrated in Fig. 3.1. Thus, to model the generation process of the popularity
dynamics accurately, we need to take many factors into consideration: the intrinsic
attribute of an item, the decaying of the attractiveness of an item as time passes,
the heterogeneity of individuals’ interests, and the influence of others’ decisions,
i.e., network externality [105]. Since this involves the interactions between multiple
decision makers, game theory [99] can be a very suitable mathematical modeling
tool here. By appealing to game theory, we can incorporate all the aforementioned
factors into the model of popularity dynamics and the equilibrium of the formu-
lated game can facilitate the understanding or even prediction of users’ behaviors
in popularity dynamics.
In the literature, game theory has been utilized to model popularity dynam-
ics [54, 55]. However, most of existing game-theoretic models only consider the
instantaneous incentives of players, i.e., the decision-makers are myopic in the sense
that they only decide based on the current state of the system or the current de-
cisions of his neighbors in the network. All the myopic players in the network
iteratively update their decisions, leading to a popularity dynamics of an item. On
the contrary, in real-world, individuals are usually more farsighted: they may pre-
dict the subsequent behaviors of other individuals and then maximize their future
53
Figure 3.1: An illustration of the decision making problem of popularity dynamics.
We use the mentioning of a Twitter hashtag as an example here. Consider an
arbitrary Twiter user who observes a Twitter hashtag. He needs to decide whether
to mention this hashtag or not based on many factors including the intrinsic quality
and timeliness of the hashtag, his own interest, current popularity of the hashtag
and future actions of other users.
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benefits based on the predictions. In other words, individuals can have long-term
incentives which depend on other individuals’ future actions. For instance, when
a Twitter user is deciding whether to forward a tweet or not, he may take the fu-
ture influence of the tweet and the future actions of other users into account: will
this tweet become popular in the future or will many other users also forward this
tweet? This is illustrated in Fig. 3.1. Different from the previous game-theoretic
frameworks for information diffusion dynamics [54,55], our model incorporates both
instantaneous incentives and long-term incentives of individuals. The latter depends
on subsequential individuals’ actions in the future. Our main contributions in this
chapter can be epitomized as follows.
• We propose a game-theoretic framework to model the sequential decision mak-
ing process of general popularity dynamics. The model incorporates both in-
stantaneous incentives and long-term incentives so that the decision-makers
are farsighted enough to take others’ future actions into account when making
decisions.
• We theoretically show that the formulated game has a unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium (SNE). We observe that the SNE is in pure strategy form and
possesses a threshold structure. Furthermore, we design a backward induction
algorithm to compute the SNE.
• From real data, we observe that: (i) most popularity dynamics first increase
and then decrease and (ii) for some dynamics, when they are increasing, the
increasing speed gradually slows down until they reach the peak and when
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they are decreasing, the decreasing speed also gradually slows down. We the-
oretically analyze these properties at the SNE of the proposed game-theoretic
model. We find that the equilibrium behavior of the proposed game confirms
with real data.
• The proposed theory is validated by both simulations and experiments based
on real data. It is shown that the proposed game-theoretic model can even
predict future dynamics of real data.
The roadmap of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 3.2, we review
the existing literature on popularity dynamics. In Section 3.3, we describe the model
in detail and formulate the problem formally. In Section 3.4, equilibrium analysis is
conducted. In Section 3.5, a property of the equilibrium is shown. Simulations and
real data experiments are carried out in Section 3.6. In Section 3.7, we conclude
this chapter.
3.2 Related Works
Recently, intensive research efforts have been devoted to network users’ be-
havior dynamics due to its importance [71]. In [87], Ratkiewicz et al. studied the
popularity dynamics of online webpages and online topics. They proposed a model
to combine classic preferential attachment [8] with the random popularity shifts
incurred by exogenous factors. Shen et al. [95] proposed to use reinforced Poisson
processes to model the popularity dynamics and presented a statistical inference
approach to predict the future dynamics accordingly.
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An important special case of popularity dynamics is the information diffusion
dynamics over social networks, which have attracted tremendous research efforts
in the recent decade. The abundant literature on information diffusion dynamics
can be divided into two categories. In the first category, researchers combine data
mining/machine learning techniques with empirical observations from real-world
datasets and propose simple models to explain the observed phenomena. Yang
and Leskovec [114] studied the temporal shapes of online information dynamics
and clustered these temporal dynamics into several patterns, which suggest several
types of information dynamics. In [70], the authors empirically studied the temporal
dynamics of online memes and discovered interesting phenomena such as an average
2.5 hours lag between the peaks of a phrase in news media and in blogs respectively.
The role of social networks, i.e., the influence between network users, in information
diffusion is studied in [7] through an experimental approach. In [40, 89, 113], with
machine learning approaches, the underlying implicit diffusion networks are inferred
from the observed information cascades to better understand the diffusion processes.
Guille and Hacid [43] proposed a predictive model for information diffusion process,
which could predict the future information dynamics accurately. In the second
category, game-theoretic analyses were conducted to understand the information
diffusion processes from the perspective of individual user’s decision making. This
category has closer relationship with this chapter. Jiang et al. [54, 55] exploited
evolutionary game theory to model and analyze the information diffusion dynamics,
where the information diffusion is treated as the consequence of the games played by
the network users. In [54,55], the users were assumed to be myopic and didn’t take
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other individuals’ future actions into account when making decisions. Furthermore,
in [37], the authors proposed a sequential game model to analyze the voting and
answering behaviors in social computing systems such as Stack Overflow, which
inspired our model in this chapter. The differences between the model in [37] and
the model here are: (i) we focus on characterizing the temporal dynamics of the
interactions while the main goal of [37] was to describe users’ behaviors (voting
and answering) when facing with certain system states; (ii) we include preferential
attachment [8] (a universal phenomenon in network science that items with large
popularity are more visible and hence can gain new popularity more easily) into our
model while [37] didn’t.
There are also many domain specific research literature on popularity dy-
namics. The citation dynamics were studied in [106] and a universal formula was
proposed to characterize the temporal citation dynamics of individual papers. The
channel popularity dynamics of Internet Protocol TV were investigated in [86] while
the authors in [68] proposed a model predict the dynamics of news. Furthermore,
a model for Twitter dynamics was presented in [60] while the dynamics of viral
marketing were studied in [69].
3.3 Model
In the generation process of popularity dynamics, multiple intelligent decision
makers decide whether to interact with an item or not with the goal of maximizing
their own utilities. The system has network externality [105], i.e., the utility of
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an individual is affected by other individuals’ actions, as explained in Section 3.1.
Game theory is a mathematical tool to study the decision-making of multiple strate-
gic agents where one’s utility is influenced by others’ actions, and thus very suitable
for modeling the popularity dynamics. Additionally, there are various equilibrium
concepts in the game theory literature which can serve as predictions of individuals’
behaviors in popularity dynamics and thus promote the understanding of the mech-
anisms of popularity dynamics. In this section, we will introduce a game-theoretic
model of the popularity dynamics in detail.
Suppose an item, item A, is generated. The item can be an online meme, an
online video or a keyword in scientific research. People decide whether to interact
with item A or not sequentially. For instance, Twitter users decide whether to
mention a hashtag or not; Youtube users decide whether to like a video or not;
researchers decide whether to quote a keyword in their papers or not. We view
the cumulative interaction dynamics xt, i.e., the total number of interactions up to
time t, as a stochastic dynamical system. We assume people, i.e., players of the
game, arrive at the system at discrete time instants t ∈ N (one player arrives at
each time instant) and decide whether to interact with item A or not. Players are
heterogeneous and have different types, which indicate the relevances of the item to
the different players. For example, for a Twitter hashtag related to football, football
fans have higher types than normal users; for a research keyword related to signal
processing, researchers specializing in signal processing have higher types than other
researchers. We suppose that each player’s type θ is a random variable distributed
in [0, 1] with probability density function (PDF) h(θ). The above concepts are
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Table 3.1: Game-theoretic model for popularity dynamics
Game-theoretic model Popularity dynamics concepts
System state at time t Cumulative interactions xt
Players People arriving at the system
Player type Relevance of the item to the player θ ∈ [0, 1]
Action set of each player {interacting, not interacting}
summarized in Table 5.1.
To complete the game-theoretic formulation, we need to define the utilities
of the players. As stated in Section 3.1, the utility should encompass both the
immediate effect and the future effect of the interactions. Furthermore, due to
the preferential attachment property of networks [8], items which already get many
interactions should be more visible, i.e., easier to be found by players arriving at
the system. Combining all these factors, the proposed model can be illustrated in
Fig. 3.2. When a player arrive at the system with state x, the item will be visible
to him with some probability related to the current state of the system. If the
item is visible to the player and he chooses to interact with the item, then he will
get an instantaneous reward which depends on both the type (e.g., hobbies) of the
player and the state of the system. Afterwards, whenever there is a new interaction
with the item (occurs at say, state y), the aforementioned player will obtain a future
reward because the current interacting player may pay attention to him. The overall
utility of the player will be a discounted sum of the instantaneous reward and all







Figure 3.2: Illustration of the state transition in the system model. The numbers
inside the blue circle are the current states. The numbers inside the green square
are the types of the arriving players.
more detail.
3.3.1 Instantaneous Reward
Each player choosing to interact with item A gets an instantaneous reward
R(x, θ), where x is the state of the system when the interaction occurs and θ is
the type of the player. For instance, if a Twitter user is interested in a hashtag,
then by mentioning this hashtag, the user will gain some immediate utility. The
instantaneous reward depends on the system state since the immediate utilities of
an item at different stages (e.g., incipient stage, blooming stage and ending stage)
are different. The instantaneous reward also depends on the type of the interacting
player because the same item is of different relevances to players of different types: a
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football fan can get much more utility by mentioning a football related hashtag than
a normal Twitter user. Note that R(x, θ) can also be negative since the interaction
implicitly incurs a cost for the player, e.g., by mentioning a hashtag, a Twitter user
needs to spend some time and efforts during the manipulation. Now, we impose five
assumptions on the function R(x, θ) as follows.
1. R(x, θ) decreases with respect to x.
2. R(x, θ) strictly increases with respect to θ.
3. R(x, θ) is continuous with respect to θ, for each given x.
4. R(0, 0) < 0 and R(0, 1) > 0.
5. limx→∞R(x, 1) < 0.
The five assumptions can be justified as follows respectively. (1) Taking time-
liness of the item into account, players who interact with the item early (when x is
small) should get higher utility than those who interact later (when x is large). For
example, a Twitter user mentioning up to date hashtags should gain higher instan-
taneous reward than a user mentioning outdated hashtags. (2) Those players who
find the item more relevant gain higher instantaneous reward by interacting with it.
(3) A technical assumption. (4) Initially (i.e., x = 0), some players’ instantaneous
rewards are positive while some are negative. (5) Even for those who find the item




For a player B choosing to interact with item A, whenever there is a subsequent
interaction with item A, this subsequent interacting player will pay attention to
player B with probability 1
x
, where x is the system state when this subsequent
interaction occurs. Thus player B will receive an expected reward of 1
x
due to the
possible attention he gets. This reward is called the future reward since it is obtained
after the interaction occurs. For instance, if a Twitter user B mentions a hashtag
A, and later, when hashtag A has already been mentioned x times, another user
C also mentions hashtag A. In such a case, user C may visit those users who have
mentioned hashtag A, and with probability 1
x
, user B will be visited by user C.
We further assume players discount future reward with factor 0 < λ < 1, which
is a common assumption in dynamic games and sequential decision making. The
instantaneous reward and the future reward together constitute the utility of an
interacting player.
3.3.3 Visibility Probability
We assume one player arrives at the system at each time instant. Item A
is visible to a player with probability f(x) ∈ [0, 1], where x is the system state
when the player arrives. In other words, after a player arrives, he/she will notice
item A with probability f(x). We also impose several assumptions on the visibility
probability function f(x) as follows.
• f(x) increases with x. Justification: Popular items are more visible. This is
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also refereed as the ‘rich gets richer’ or preferential attachment phenomenon
in network science [8].
• f(0) > 0. Justification: Even the most unpopular item is visible with positive
probability.
3.3.4 Action Rule and Utility Function
When a player arrives at the system and sees item A, he/she needs to decide
whether to interact with the item or not based on the current system state x and
his/her type θ. For sake of generality, we allow the players to use mixed action
rule π : N × [0, 1] :→ [0, 1], where π(x, θ) is the probability of choosing the action
interacting when the state is x and the type of the player is θ. Denote the set
of all possible mixed action rules as Π. We denote gπ(x) the long-term utility of an
interacting player starting from state x while the subsequent players use action rule
π.
Denote pπ(x) = Eθ[π(x, θ)], i.e., the expected probability of a new interaction
when the system state is x and users adopt action rule π. Thus, the long term utility
gπ(x) can be computed recursively as follows. ∀x ≥ 1:
gπ(x) =
instantaneous reward at the current time slot︷ ︸︸ ︷
f(x)pπ(x)
x
+λ {f(x)pπ(x)gπ(x+ 1) + [1− f(x)pπ(x)] gπ(x)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
reward in future time slots
. (3.1)
Denote u(x, θ, a, π) the utility of a type-θ player who enters the system in state x
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and takes action a while other players adopt action rule π. Thus,
u(x, θ, a, π) =

R(x, θ) + λgπ(x+ 1), if a =interacting,
0, if a =not interacting.
(3.2)
If a player chooses mixed action, i.e., interacting with probability q, then his/her
utility is:
U(x, θ, q, π) = q[R(x, θ) + λgπ(x+ 1)]. (3.3)
3.3.5 Solution Concept
In this chapter, the solution concept is chosen to be the symmetric Nash equi-
librium (SNE), which is defined in the following.
Definition 3.1 An action rule π∗ is said to be a symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE)
if:
π∗(x, θ) ∈ arg max
q∈[0,1]
U(x, θ, q, π∗), ∀x ∈ N, θ ∈ [0, 1]. (3.4)
In an SNE, no player wants to deviate unilaterally, hence the action rule is self
enforcing.
3.4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we show that there is a unique SNE of the formulated game.
A backward induction algorithm for computing this unique SNE is also presented.
The infinite-horizon sequential game is effectively of finite length, given the
following lemma, which says that no one will interact with item A after a certain
number of interactions is reached.
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Lemma 3.1 There exists an x̃ ∈ N such that ∀x ≥ x̃, θ ∈ [0, 1], π ∈ Π:
u(x, θ, interacting, π) < u(x, θ, not interacting, π), (3.5)
i.e., the action interacting is strictly dominated by the action not interacting
regardless of the player type and other players’ action rule.
Proof: The long-term utility of an interacting player starting from state x



















→ 0, as x→∞. (3.6)





Hence, ∀x ≥ x̃, θ ∈ [0, 1], π ∈ Π:




i.e., u(x, θ, interacting, π) < u(x, θ, not interacting, π) due to the utility ex-
pression in (3.2).
Denote x̂ = max{x ∈ N|R(x, 1) > 0}. We design a backward induction
algorithm, Algorithm 3.1, to compute the SNE. We first show that the action rule
obtained from Algorithm 3.1 is indeed an SNE.
Theorem 3.1 (Existence of the SNE) The action rule π∗ computed by Algorithm
3.1 is an SNE.
Proof: According to Lemma 3.1, ∀x ≥ x̃, θ ∈ [0, 1] : arg maxq∈[0,1] U(x, θ, q, π∗) =
{0}. Thus, π∗(x, θ) ∈ arg maxq∈[0,1] U(x, θ, q, π∗),∀x ≥ x̃, θ ∈ [0, 1].
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Algorithm 3.1: Computation of the unique equilibrium
Inputs:
Instantaneous reward function R(x, θ).
Player type PDF h(θ).
Visibility probability function f(x).
Discount factor λ.
Outputs:
Unique equilibrium action rule π∗(x, θ).
1: When x ≥ x̂+ 1: π∗(x, θ) = 0, θ ∈ [0, 1]; gπ∗(x) = 0.
2: Let x = x̂.
3: while x ≥ 0 do
4: if R(x, 0) + λgπ∗(x+ 1) > 0 then
5: θ∗x = 0,
6: else





1, if θ ≥ θ∗x,





















10: x← x− 1.
11: end while
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When x̂+ 1 ≤ x ≤ x̃− 1, we have the following. ∀θ ∈ [0, 1]:
u(x, θ, interacting, π∗) = R(x, θ) + λgπ∗(x+ 1) = R(x, θ) ≤ R(x, 1) ≤ 0. (3.12)
So, π∗(x, θ) = 0 ∈ arg maxq∈[0,1] U(x, θ, q, π∗).
When x = x̂, we still have u(x̂, θ, interacting, π∗) = R(x, θ). If θ ≥ θ∗x, we
have u(x̂, θ, interacting, π∗) ≥ 0 and thus π∗(x, θ) = 1 ∈ arg maxq∈[0,1] U(x, θ, q, π∗).
If θ < θ∗x, we have u(x̂, θ, interacting, π
∗) < 0 and hence π∗(x, θ) = 0 ∈ arg maxq∈[0,1]
U(x, θ, q, π∗).
When x ≤ x̂− 1, we discuss two cases:
• Case 1: R(x, 0) + λgπ∗(x+ 1) > 0. In this case, θ∗x = 0 and π∗(x, θ) = 1,∀θ ∈
[0, 1]. Thus, u(x, θ, interacting, π∗) ≥ R(x, 0) + λgπ∗(x+ 1) > 0,∀θ. Hence,
π∗(x, θ) = 1 ∈ arg maxq∈[0,1] U(x, θ, q, π∗),∀θ.
• Case 2: R(x, 0) + λgπ∗(x+ 1) ≤ 0. In such a case, if θ ≥ θ∗x, then
u(x, θ, interacting, π∗) ≥ 0 and thus π∗(x, θ) = 1 ∈ arg maxq∈[0,1] U(x, θ, q, π∗).
Otherwise, if θ < θ∗x, then u(x, θ, interacting, π
∗) < 0 and π∗(x, θ) = 0 ∈
arg maxq∈[0,1] U(x, θ, q, π∗).
Overall, we always have π∗(x, θ) ∈ arg maxq∈[0,1] U(x, θ, q, π∗),∀x, θ ∈ [0, 1].
We further prove that the π∗ computed in Algorithm 3.1 is indeed the unique
SNE.
Theorem 3.2 (Uniqueness of the SNE) Suppose the distribution of player type θ is
atomless, i.e., h(θ) is finite for every θ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, any SNE π̃ differs with π∗
for zero mass players, i.e., P{π̃(x, θ) 6= π∗(x, θ)} = 0 for every x ∈ N.
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Proof: Suppose π̃ is an SNE, i.e., π̃(x, θ) ∈ arg maxq∈[0,1] U(x, θ, q, π̃),∀x, θ ∈
[0, 1]. In the following, we show that π̃ differs from π∗ for zero-mass players. We
discuss for different values of x as follows.
• Case 1: x ≥ x̃. From Lemma 3.1, we know that ∀θ ∈ [0, 1], u(x, θ, interacting, π̃)
< 0. So, π̃(x, θ) = 0 = π∗(x, θ).
• Case 2: x̂+ 1 ≤ x ≤ x̃− 1. First, we note that u(x̃− 1, θ, interacting, π̃) =
R(x̃ − 1, θ). When θ < 1, u(x̃ − 1, θ, interacting, π̃) < 0, and thus π̃(x̃ −
1, θ) = 0. Hence, pπ̃(x̃ − 1) = 0 and gπ̃(x̃ − 1) = 0. Suppose we have
π̃(x+1, θ) = gπ̃(x+1) = 0, where x̂+1 ≤ x ≤ x̃−2. Then, for θ < 1, we have
u(x, θ, interacting, π̃) = R(x, θ) < 0. Hence, π̃(x, θ) = 0,∀θ. Thus, px̃(x) =
gx̃(x) = 0. By induction, we know that π̃(x, θ) = gπ̃(x) = 0, ∀x̂+1 ≤ x ≤ x̃−1
and θ < 1. In particular, we still have π̃(x, θ) = π∗(x, θ), ∀x̂ + 1 ≤ x ≤ x̃− 1
and θ < 1.
• Case 3: x = x̂. u(x̂, θ, interacting, π̃) = R(x̂, θ). If θ > θ∗x̂, we have
u(x̂, θ, interacting, π̃) > 0 and thus π̃(x̂, θ) = 1. Similarly, if θ < θ∗x̂, we have
π̃(x̂, θ) = 0. So, π̃(x̂, θ) = π∗(x̂, θ),∀θ 6= θ∗x̂. Hence, pπ̃(x̂) = pπ
∗
(x̂), gπ̃(x̂) =
gπ∗(x̂), π̃(x̂, θ) = π
∗(x̂, θ),∀θ 6= θ∗x̂.
• Case 4: x ≤ x̂−1. Suppose for some 1 ≤ x ≤ x̂−1, we have gx̃(x+1) = gπ∗(x+
1) and π̃(x+ 1, θ) = π∗(x+ 1, θ),∀θ 6= θ∗x+1. We note that these already hold
for x = x̂ − 1 according to Case 3. Thus, we have u(x, θ, interacting, π̃) =
R(x, θ) + λgπ̃(x+ 1) = R(x, θ) + λgπ∗(x+ 1). If θ > θ
∗
x, we have
u(x, θ, interacting, π̃) > 0 and thus π̃(x, θ) = 1. Otherwise, if θ < θ∗x, we
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have u(x, θ, interacting, π̃) < 0 and π̃(x, θ) = 0. Consequently, we have
π̃(x, θ) = π∗(x, θ),∀θ 6= θ∗x and hence gπ̃(x) = gπ∗(x). So, by induction, we
have π̃(x, θ) = π∗(x, θ),∀θ 6= θ∗x,∀x ≤ x̂− 1, θ 6= θ∗x.
In all, we have π̃ = π∗ except for a zero mass amount of players.
Remark 3.1 The unique SNE of the game is in pure strategy form and possesses a
threshold structure. For every state x, there exists a threshold θ∗x such that a player
of type θ will interact with item A if and only if θ ≥ θ∗x.
3.5 Popularity Dynamics at the Equilibrium
In this section, we first observe some properties of popularity dynamics from
real data. Then, we analyze the corresponding properties at the equilibrium of
the proposed game. We find that the equilibrium behavior of the proposed game-
theoretic model confirms with the real data.
3.5.1 Observations from real data
In Fig. 3.3, we plot mention dynamics of popular memes and sum citation
dynamics of all the papers published in Nature in 1990. Here, we use the dynamics
of memes and the citation dynamics of papers as examples of popularity dynamics.
We observe that, typically, the popularity dynamics of an item will first in-
crease and then decrease, leading to a peak in the dynamics. This is a general
first order property of popularity dynamics. Thus, a natural question is: does the
equilibrium behavior of the proposed game-theoretic model possess this property?
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Intuitively, it should. The reason is as follows. At first, according to our model,
the visibility probability is low since the item has few interactions. As time goes,
the item accumulates more interactions so that the visibility probability increases
and the interaction rate, i.e., the dynamics observed in Fig. 3.3, also increases.
When time is sufficiently large, the visibility probability basically saturates. With
the augment of the cumulative interactions, the instantaneous reward and long-term
reward decreases so that few players will further interact with the item, leading to
a decrease in interaction rate. In next subsection, we will formally state and prove
this first order property.
Furthermore, we observe that some popularity dynamics, especially the cita-
tion dynamics of papers as in Fig. 3.3-(b), Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.7-(c)(d), have the
following second order property: when it is increasing, its increasing speed gradu-
ally slows down and when it is decreasing, its decreasing speed also gradually slows
down. This behavior is reasonable. Many items’ interaction rates increase drasti-
cally when they first come out and keep increasing (but at a lower speed) until they
reach the peak. Later, after the items are no longer that popular, their interaction
rates decrease quickly and will keep decreasing for some time (but at a lower speed).
In next subsection, we will formally state and prove this second order property under
certain assumptions.
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(a) Mention dynamics of popular
memes.
(b) Sum citation dynamics of all the papers published in
Nature in 1990.
Fig. 3.3: Real-world popularity dynamics [46,114].
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3.5.2 Properties at the equilibrium
Generally, the unique SNE should be computed using the backward induction
as specified in Algorithm 3.1, which is hard to analyze. To facilitate analysis, we
further restrict attention to models satisfying the following three assumptions:
(1) (Linear reward) R(x, θ) = −x+ aθ − b, where a > b > 0.
(2) (Uniform player type distribution) h(θ) = 1, ∀θ ∈ [0, 1].
(3) (Saturated visibility probability) There exists a x̌ ∈ N less than x̂ = ba− bc such








These three assumptions can be justified as follows. (1) Linear reward is used to
simplify the analysis and it indeed increases with θ and decreases with x, which
coincides with the assumptions in Section 3.3. (2) Uniform player type distribution
is also to simplify calculations though our analysis is applicable to more complicated
distributions in principle. (3) When the number of interactions is large enough, the
item becomes ‘famous’ enough so that it is visible to everyone arriving at the system.
Before this saturation occurs, however, it increases at a speed not too slow. Note
that the R.H.S. of (3.13) is very close to 1 since the numerator of the ratio is close
to 1 while the denominator is some integer much larger than 1 generally. So, the
assumption is indeed very weak.
Denote r(x) = f(x)pπ
∗
(x), i.e., the probability that there is a new interaction
at state x in the SNE. We first show the first order property of the SNE.
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Theorem 3.3 (First order characterization of the SNE) Suppose the as-
sumptions (1)(2)(3) hold, the SNE π∗ satisfies the following:
• For 1 ≤ x ≤ x̌: r(x) ≥ r(x− 1);
• For x ≥ x̌: r(x) ≥ r(x+ 1).
In other words, the interaction rate r(x) first increases and then decreases.
Proof: According to the assumptions of linear reward and uniform player type
distribution, we can obtain closed form expression of the iterative update of θ∗x and
pπ
∗
(x) in Algorithm 3.1 as follows: ∀x ≤ x̂ = ba− bc:
pπ
∗
(x) = 1− 1
a














where x+ , max{x, 0}.
We first consider the case x ≥ x̌. In the following, we show that gπ∗ is decreas-
ing for x̌ ≤ x ≤ x̂ + 1. When x̌ ≤ x ≤ x̂, noticing that f(x) = 1, we rewrite (3.15)
as:













Since gπ∗(x̂+ 1) = 0, we have:









Suppose gπ∗(x) ≥ gπ∗(x + 1) and gπ∗(x) ≤ p
π∗ (x)
(1−λ)x ,∀m ≤ x ≤ x̂ for some x̌ + 1 ≤
m ≤ x̂ (note that we already show that these hold for m = x̂). We next show




According to (3.14), for m ≤ x ≤ x̂:
pπ
∗
(x− 1) = 1− 1
a
(x− 1 + b− λgπ∗(x))+, (3.18)
pπ
∗
(x) = 1− 1
a
(x+ b− λgπ∗(x+ 1))+. (3.19)
Since gπ∗(x) ≥ gπ∗(x+ 1),∀m ≤ x ≤ x̂, comparing the above two expressions,
we have pπ
∗










Hence, by (3.16) and (3.20), we obtain:









































Hence, by induction, we have gπ∗(x) ≥ gπ∗(x + 1) and gπ∗(x) ≤ p
π∗ (x)
(1−λ)x ,∀x̌ ≤
x ≤ x̂. Thus, by (3.14), we have: pπ∗(x − 1) ≥ pπ∗(x), ∀x̌ ≤ x ≤ x̂. Note that
pπ
∗
(x) = 0, ∀x ≥ x̂ + 1 since π∗(x, θ) = 0,∀x ≥ x̂ + 1, θ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, for x ≥ x̌:
pπ
∗
(x) ≥ pπ∗(x+ 1). So, for x ≥ x̌: r(x) ≥ r(x+ 1).
Next, we consider the case x ≤ x̌(≤ x̂). In such a case, we rewrite the update














(x+ b− λgπ∗(x+ 1))+
]
f(x),∀0 ≤ x ≤ x̌. (3.24)
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Rewriting (3.23) yields: ∀1 ≤ x ≤ x̌:
























(x+ b− λgπ∗(x+ 1))+
1− 1
a




For 1 ≤ x ≤ x̌, from (3.25) we have:






























We further know that:
1− 1
a
(x+ b− λgπ∗(x+ 1))+ ≥ 1−
1
a






(x− 1 + b− λgπ∗(x))+
1− 1
a



































Combining (3.33) and (3.34) yields:
1− 1
a
(x− 1 + b− λgπ∗(x))+
1− 1
a




which, according to (3.26), is equivalent to:
r(x) ≥ r(x− 1), (3.36)
where 1 ≤ x ≤ x̌.
Next we turn to the second order property of the SNE.
Theorem 3.4 (Second order characterization of the SNE) Suppose that the
assumptions (1)(2)(3) hold. Further assume that (i) λ ≤ 1








f(x− 2) ≤ 2f(x− 1). Then the SNE π∗ satisfies the following:
• For 2 ≤ x ≤ x̌: 0 ≤ r(x)− r(x− 1) ≤ r(x− 1)− r(x− 2);
• For x ≥ x̌+ 2: 0 ≤ r(x− 1)− r(x) ≤ r(x− 2)− r(x− 1).
In other words, we have: (a) when r(x) is increasing, its increasing speed gradually
slows down; (b) when r(x) is decreasing, its decreasing speed also gradually slows
down.
Proof: We first consider the case x̌+ 2 ≤ x ≤ x̂− 1. From λ ≤ 1
a−b , we get:
λ
(







(x) is decreasing for x ≥ x̌, we have:
pπ
∗































For any x̌ ≤ x ≤ x̂:




So, from (3.14), for any x̌+ 2 ≤ x ≤ x̂− 1, we obtain:
pπ
∗












where the last inequality is due to the monotonicity of gπ∗(x) for x ≥ x̌. Combining

















































From (3.15), we have:


























From monotonicity of pπ
∗







1− λ(1− pπ∗(x− 1))
. (3.49)
Combining (3.46) and (3.49) yields:
gπ∗(x)− gπ∗(x+ 1) ≤ gπ∗(x− 1)− gπ∗(x). (3.50)





[2gπ∗(x)− gπ∗(x− 1)− gπ∗(x+ 1)] ≤ 0. (3.51)
So, r(x− 1)− r(x) ≤ r(x− 2)− r(x− 1),∀x̌ + 2 ≤ x ≤ x̂− 1. Furthermore, since









(x̂− 1 + b− λgπ∗(x̂)) + 1−
1
a
(x+ 1 + b− λgπ∗(x̂+ 2))
< 1− 1
a














(x̂− 1) + pπ∗(x̂+ 1)) (3.53)
Thus, we have r(x̂) − r(x̂ + 1) ≤ r(x̂ − 1) − r(x̂). Since λ ≤ 1
a−b , we have x̂ − 1 ≤





































(x̂− 1)− pπ∗(x̂)− pπ∗(x̂− 2) = λ
a
[2gπ∗(x̂)− gπ∗(x̂− 1)] ≤ 0. (3.56)
So, r(x̂ − 1) − r(x̂) ≤ r(x̂ − 2) − r(x̂ − 1). Hence, overall, r(x − 1) − r(x) ≤
r(x− 2)− r(x− 1),∀x ≥ x̌+ 2.
Now, consider 2 ≤ x ≤ x̌. Because gπ∗(x + 1) ≤ 1(1−λ)(x+1) ≤
1










. Hence, from (3.25), we get:






















(x+ b− λgπ∗(x+ 1))+
1− 1
a
(x− 1 + b− λgπ∗(x))+
≤ 1. (3.59)
80
Together with (3.33), we know that:
1− 1
a
(x+ b− λgπ∗(x+ 1))+
1− 1
a




(x− 2 + b− λgπ∗(x− 1))+
1− 1
a












Thus, r(x)+r(x−2) ≤ 2r(x−1), i.e., r(x)−r(x−1) ≤ r(x−1)−r(x−2),∀ 2 ≤ x ≤ x̌.
Remark 3.2 Assumption (i) of Theorem 3.4 requires the discount factor λ to be
sufficiently small, or in other words, players of the popularity dynamics game are
myopic and don’t care about future rewards very much. Assumption (ii) is basically
equivalent to f(x) − f(x − 1) ≤ f(x − 1) − f(x − 2), ∀2 ≤ x ≤ x̌ since the ratio in
the parenthesis of (ii) is usually very small. This requires f(x)’s increasing speed
is slowing down as x approaches x̌, which is a reasonable assumption. Moreover,
we notice that Theorem 3.4 does not cover all the situations of popularity dynamics.
There are real-world popularity dynamics, such as those in Fig. 3.3-(a), which have
more complicated second order patterns. For example, during increasing phase of
the dynamics, the increasing speed can first increase and then decrease. Due to the
intricacy of these second order patterns, we don’t give theoretical discussions about
them here.
3.6 Simulations and Real Data Experiments
In this section, we conduct simulations and real data experiments to validate
the theoretical results obtained. We choose the form of instantaneous reward func-
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tion to be linear, i.e., R(x, θ) = −x+ aθ − b, where a > b > 0.
3.6.1 Simulations






+ 1− α, (3.61)
where α, β are parameters controlling the initial visibility probability and the in-
creasing speed of the visibility probability. We set the discount factor to be λ = 0.5.
For different parameter setups of a, b, α, β, we stochastically simulate the equilib-
rium popularity dynamics calculated by Algorithm 3.1 many times and then take
average of them. Here, the equilibrium behaviors are stochastic because (i) the user
types are random variables; (ii) whether the item is visible to the arriving player
is random. We also theoretically compute the expected equilibrium popularity dy-
namics by Algorithm 3.1, which serve as the theoretical dynamics. Specifically, for
theoretical dynamics, at each time instant, we replace the actual stochastic equilib-
rium behavior with the expected equilibrium behavior. This deviation may affect
the system state at the next time instant, which in turn influence the equilibrium
behaviors at the next time instant since players’ strategies depend on the system
state. In other words, the deviation caused by using the expected equilibrium be-
haviors to approximate the actual stochastic equilibrium behaviors may propagate
and accumulate. The simulations are aimed at verifying that this approximation
does not hurt much, i.e., the theoretical dynamics can still match well with the
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Figure 3.4: Simulation results under different parameter setups.
simulated ones. The theoretical cumulative dynamics as well as the corresponding
simulated cumulative dynamics are shown in Fig. 4.1, from which we observe that
(i) the theoretical dynamics indeed match well with the simulated dynamics; (ii)
the proposed game-theoretic model can flexibly generate popularity dynamics of
different shapes by tuning the parameters.
3.6.2 Real data experiments
In this subsection, real data experiments are carried out to verify that the pro-
posed theory matches well with the real-world popularity dynamics. The datasets
we use here are Twitter hashtag dataset [114] and the citation data of papers from
the Web of Science [46]. The Twitter hashtag data are the mentioning counts of pop-
ular hashtags from June to December 2009. We first use the equilibrium computed
by Algorithm 3.1 to fit the mention dynamics of four popular Twitter hashtags in
83



















































































































Fig. 3.5: Fitting Twitter hashtag dynamics.
Fig. 3.5. To fit a popularity dynamics, we use the dynamics data to estimate the pa-
rameters of the proposed model and then use the estimated parameters to generate
a theoretical dynamics, which is the fitting result. We observe that the theoretical
fitting dynamics match well with the real-world dynamics. We further fit the av-
erage citation dynamics of the papers published in Nature 1990 and Science 1990,
respectively, in Fig. 3.6. We remark that the fitting is still very accurate, though
the temporal shape of the citation dynamics are very different from that of the
Twitter hashtag dynamics, confirming the universality of our theory for popularity
dynamics.
Additionally, we can even exploit the equilibrium of the proposed game to
predict future dynamics for real data. To this end, we use part of the dynamics
data to train the proposed game-theoretic model, i.e., estimate the parameters in
the model, and then predict future dynamics by using the trained model. The
84















































Fig. 3.6: Fitting paper citation dynamics.
prediction results are reported in Fig. 3.7, from which we see that the prediction is
quite accurate. To highlight the advantage of the proposed approach, we compare
with the prediction results of two existing methods, namely the methods in [106]
and [54], which are reported in Figures 3.8 and 3.9, respectively. The four dynamics
to be predicted are the same as those in Fig. 3.7. First, we note that the approach
in [106] is proposed for citation dynamics. From Fig. 3.8, we observe that the
method of [106] fails in predicting the dynamics of the two hashtags (subfigures (a)
and (b)). Even for prediction of citation dynamics (subfigures (c) and (d)), our
approach outperforms the method in [106]. Second, noting that the method in [54]
is designed for information diffusion dynamics, we observe that our approach still
outperforms it when predicting the dynamics of two hashtags (Fig. 3.9-(a) and Fig.
3.9-(b)). When it comes to the prediction of citation dynamics, our approach is much
better than the method in [54] (Fig. 3.9-(c) and Fig. 3.9-(d)). These comparisons
demonstrate that our proposed approach is universally good for general popularity
dynamics. Even compared with methods specifically designed for a certain kind
of popularity dynamics (e.g., [54] for information diffusion and [106] for citations),
our method is still better. In addition, the performance enhancement over the
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Fig. 3.7: Predicting future dynamics.
method in [54] can be ascribed to the fact that the model in [54] is merely based
on instantaneous incentives while our model incorporates long-term incentives as
well, which suggests the importance and necessity of taking long-term incentives of
individuals into account.
Generally, the prediction is accurate when the training period includes the
peak of the dynamics. However, sometimes, we may even predict future dynamics
accurately without knowing the peak, which is illustrated by a Twitter hashtag
#Tehran in Fig. 3.10.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, a sequential game is proposed to characterize the mechanisms
of popularity dynamics. We prove that the proposed game has a unique SNE, which
is a pure strategy action rule with a threshold structure and can be computed using
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Fig. 3.8: Prediction results of the method in [106]












































































































Fig. 3.9: Prediction results of the method in [54]
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Figure 3.10: Prediction before reaching the peak of the dynamics: Twitter hashtag
#Tehran.
a backward induction algorithm. Moreover, at the equilibrium of the proposed
game, we analyze some properties observed from the real data, demonstrating that
the equilibrium behavior of the proposed game confirms with real-world popularity
dynamics. The theory is validated by both simulations and experiments based on
real data. The proposed model can even predict future dynamics.
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Chapter 4
A Graphical Evolutionary Game Approach to Social Learning
4.1 Motivation
In the recent decade, tremendous research efforts have been devoted to the
social learning problems, in which agents of networked systems learn from not only
their own private signals but also other agents. Applications of such social learn-
ing problems are ubiquitous in fields such as state estimation in power systems,
distributed detection over sensor networks and behavior analysis of social networks.
The setups of the social learning problems can be sorted into two categories.
In the first category, agents arrive at the system sequentially and make one-shot
decisions consecutively based on their own private observations and the actions of
their predecessors. In [63,64], the sequential detection problem was studied by using
partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDP). The impact of the mem-
ory size of the agents was investigated in [30,61]. The effect of noisy communications
in sequential detection was considered in [116] while the benefits of randomness of
decision making were studied in [109]. Furthermore, a Chinese restaurant game-
theoretic analysis of agents’ sequential decision making processes was presented
in [105]. The problem formulation of this letter is closer to the second category of
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social learning setups, in which agents are fixed and networked and update their
actions iteratively based on their own private signals and neighbor agents’ actions
or beliefs. In this line of models, the consensus hypothesis testing over networks was
investigated in [12,108], while its applications in wireless communications were con-
sidered in [76]. Moreover, a non-Bayesian social learning method with the property
of asymptotic learning was proposed in [51]. Overviews on topics in social learning,
distributed detection/estimation over networks were presented in [28,29,84].
As the social learning problems involve interactions (learning and decision
making) between multiple agents, game theory emerges as an appropriate mathe-
matical tool to study them [99]. In [32,33], a Bayesian quadratic network game filter
was proposed for rational agents to learn the state of the world in a cooperative man-
ner. A Bayesian dynamic game model of social learning was investigated and the
conditions of asymptotic learning were presented in [2]. Additionally, the network
users’ decision making problems were studied with a Bayesian game formulation
in [65,66].
In this chapter, inspired by the recent success of evolutionary game theory in
diverse fields [14,53–55,80,83], we propose a graphical evolutionary game-theoretic
method for social learning. In the proposed method, based on a death-birth decision
update rule, agents only need to communicate their binary decisions instead of
the real-valued beliefs with their neighbors, which endows the method with low
communication complexity. By invoking mean field approximations, we analyze
the steady state equilibria of the game and show that the evolutionarily stable
states (ESSs) [110] coincide with the decisions of the benchmark centralized detector.
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Lastly, we present numerical results to confirm the effectiveness of the proposed
game-theoretic learning method.
4.2 Problem Formulation
Consider a network of N agents or nodes (the two terms are used interchange-
ably in the following). Assume for simplicity that the network is k-regular, i.e.,
the degree (number of neighbors) of each agent is k. In practice, many networks
are k-regular graphs. For example, many sensor networks are grid networks over
2-dimensional plane and are thus 4-regular graphs [56]; many cellular communica-
tion networks are comprised of hexagon cells (each hexagon cell corresponds to the
service area of one base station) and are hence 6-regular graphs. In the social learn-
ing problem, there is an unknown state of the nature θ ∈ {0, 1} to be detected by
all the nodes in a collaborative manner based on their individual private signals or
measurements. Suppose the prior distribution of θ is Pr(θ = 0) = Pr(θ = 1) = 0.5.
Agents are sorted into I categories depending on the qualities of their private sig-
nals, i.e., the usefulness of the private signals in detecting the unknown state θ.
Suppose agent n has some private signal sn and its type is i. Then, its private belief
is pi = Pr{θ = 0|sn}. Clearly, if pi is close to 0 or 1, then the signals of type-i agents
are useful for detecting θ. Oppositely, if pi is close to 0.5, then the signals of type-i
agents are not very useful.
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4.2.1 The Centralized Detector
In this subsection, a centralized detector, i.e., a detector utilizing the signals of
all agents in a centralized manner, is derived as a performance benchmark. Assume
that, given the true state θ, the signals s1, ..., sN (henceforth s1:N for shorthand) are
conditionally independent, i.e., p(s1:N |θ) = ΠNn=1p(sn|θ). With the signals s1:N of all
N nodes, a centralized processor can form the posterior distribution Pr(θ = 0|s1:N)
according to the Bayesian rule as follows:
Pr(θ = 0|s1:N) (4.1)
=
p(s1:N |θ = 0) Pr(θ = 0)













where we denote the proportion of type-i agents as qi. With a threshold of 0.5 for the













4.2.2 A Graphical Evolutionary Game Framework
The centralized detector has several drawbacks such as large communication
overhead and vulnerability to link failures which make it infeasible in many appli-
cations. Therefore, we are motivated to find another detection algorithm with the
following favorable properties.
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• P1 The detection algorithm is distributed, i.e., each agent only communicates
with its neighbors and no centralized entity is needed.
• P2 Agents only interchange their current binary decisions on the state θ instead
of their real-valued beliefs (posterior distributions) on θ. This reduces the
communication complexity significantly.
• P3 The detection algorithm produces the same result as the centralized detec-
tor (4.5) does, possibly asymptotically if the algorithm is iterative.
In this subsection, we present a graphical evolutionary game social learning ap-
proach, which satisfies the aforementioned three properties. Suppose each agent
n has a decision dn ∈ {0, 1} on the state θ and the decision dn shall be updated
iteratively in the game. When a type-i agent n interacts with one of its neighbors,
agent m, the utility of agent n is summarized in the following table for different
combinations of actions of the two interacting parties n and m:
dm = 0 dm = 1
dn = 0 log(1− pi) + u − log(1− pi)
dn = 1 − log pi − log pi + u
Here u ≥ 0 is some non-negative constant used to capture the fact that agents
tend to imitate their neighbors (or friends in social networks) and reach consensus.
Additionally, agent n also tends to adhere to its own private belief pi. As such, we
reward or penalize the utility of agent n for actions conforming to or deviating from
its belief pi, respectively. The usage of logarithmic terms in the utility is inspired by
the centralized detector (4.5). For an agent with total utility U through interactions
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with her neighbors, we further define her fitness π as a convex combination of U
and 1: π = 1 − α + αU , where α > 0 is some small positive constant called the
selection strength in evolutionary game theory. The bigger the selection strength α,
the more heavily the fitness π depends on the utility U and the bigger the advantage
of agents with large utility. For a type-i agent with k0 neighbors making decision 0,
if he makes decision d = 0, then his fitness is:
π0(i, k0) =1− α + α[k0(− log(1− pi) + u)− (k − k0) log(1− pi)]. (4.6)
If he makes decision d = 1, then his fitness is:
π1(i, k0) = 1− α + α[−k0 log pi + (k − k0)(− log pi + u)]. (4.7)
Based on fitness, agents can update their decisions according to some strategy
update rule. In the literature of graphical evolutionary game theory [14, 54, 55,
82, 83], there are mainly three strategy update rules: the death-birth process, the
birth-death process and the imitation process. In this letter, we will focus on the
death-birth update rule and other rules can be similarly analyzed. In the death-
birth update rule, at each time slot, one agent is selected to abandon her decision
uniformly randomly (death process) and the chosen agent update her decision to
be one of her neighbors’ decisions with probability proportional to their fitness
(birth process). This decision update process continues repeatedly across time. In
this chapter, our goal is to study the agents’ steady state behaviors in this update
process.
The proportion of adoption of decision 0 among type-i agents is denoted as
xi while the proportion of adoption of decision 0 among all agents is denoted as x.
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We call xi the population dynamics of type-i agents and x the population dynamics
of the entire network (or simply population dynamics). Obviously, we have x =∑I
i=1 qixi. Our goal in this letter is to study the steady state equilibrium of the
population dynamics x and show that this equilibrium coincides with the centralized
detector (4.5).
We note that the gossip method proposed in [108] tackles a similar social
learning problem and also possesses properties P1, P2 and P3. In this chapter, we
take an alternative approach based on evolutionary game theory as opposed to the
gossip based method in [108]. The proposed game-theoretic social learning method
takes agents’ rational learning and decision-making behaviors (such as learning from
neighbors with high fitness) into consideration and is thus more amenable to prac-
tical implementations in systems with intellegient or strategic agents, e.g., social
networks.
4.3 Algorithm Development and Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we develop the detailed algorithm of the game-theoretic social
learning method and analyze the corresponding steady state equilibrium, i.e., the
evolutionarily stable state (ESS) [110], of the population dynamics x. Suppose,
at a time instant, a type-i agent with decision 0 is chosen to abandon her decision.
According to the death-birth update rule, this agent should update her decision to be
one of her neighbors’ decisions with probability proportional to fitness. However, as
we only allow the agents to communicate their decisions d rather than their private
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beliefs p (property P2), the chosen agent is unaware of her neighbors’ fitness, which
depend on their private beliefs. As such, the chosen agent will update her decision
as if all of her neighbors’ types are i, i.e., their beliefs are pi, and only take the
neighbors’ decisions into consideration. Thus, the probability that the chosen agent




(k − k0)π1(i, k0)
k0π0(i, k0) + (k − k0)π1(i, k0)
. (4.8)
Exploiting the expressions of fitness in (4.6) and (4.7) and making use of the first
order approximation 1+aα
1+bα
≈ 1 + (a − b)α for small α, we compute the transition




































Note that k0 is a binomially distributed random variable with probability mass
function (PMF) β(k, k0) =
k
k0
xk0(1 − x)k−k0 . Using the moments of binomial
distribution, we obtain E[k0] = kx, E[k20] = (k2 − k)x2 + kx, E[k30] = k(k − 1)(k −















[−(k − 1)x2 + (k − 1)x]
− 2uα[(−k + 3− 2k−1)x3 + (k − 4 + 3k−1)x2
+ (1− k−1)x] (4.10)
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Noticing that the probability of choosing a type-i agent with decision 0 to abandon















Similarly, by considering the scenario where a type-i agent with decision 1 is selected























We approximate the discrete time decision update system with a continuous time
version, as per convention in the analysis of graphical evolutionary game [14,54,55,
82,83]. Thus, utilizing (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12), we derive the evolutionary dynamics
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Taking a weighted average over all types, we get the evolutionary dynamics of the
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. Note that λ is just the discriminant used in the central-
ized detector (4.5). Now, we are ready to present the main theorem of this letter
regarding the ESS of the social learning game.
Theorem 4.1 (i) Suppose the degree k ≥ 2. Then, the set of evolutionarily stable
states (ESSs) X ∗ of the social learning game is:
X ∗ =

{0}, if λ > u− 2k−1u,
{1}, if λ < −u+ 2k−1u,
{0, 1}, if − u+ 2k−1u < λ < u− 2k−1u.
(ii) If we further assume that the initial value of the population dynamics x is
x(0) = 0.5, which can be achieved by a random guess by all agents, then the ESS x∗
that the population dynamics x converges to is:
x∗ =

0, if λ > 0,
1, if λ < 0.
(4.16)
Proof: (i) Letting ẋ = 0 in the population dynamics (4.15) yields three equi-




. For an equilibrium point to be an ESS,
it needs to be a locally asymptotically stable for the underlying dynamical system.
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To test the stability of the three equilibria, we form the Jacobian matrix J ∈ R2×2




































































x(x− 1)(−k + 3− 2k−1)
As J is upper triangular and ∂ẋi
∂xi
is negative, the locally asymptotically stability is
equivalent to ∂ẋ
∂x
< 0. Therefore, x = 0 is an ESS iff ∂ẋ
∂x
|x=0 < 0, i.e., λ > −u+2k−1u.
Similarly, x = 1 is an ESS iff ∂ẋ
∂x
|x=1 < 0, i.e., λ < u − 2k−1u. x = x̃ is an ESS iff
∂ẋ
∂x
|x=x̃ < 0, i.e., x̃ < 0 or x̃ > 1, which contradict to the fact that the population
dynamics is within [0, 1]. So, x̃ can never be an ESS. We thus conclude the first
part of the theorem.
(ii) If λ > u− 2k−1u, then the unique ESS is 0 and the population dynamics
x will converge to it. Similarly, if λ < −u + 2k−1u, then the unique ESS is 1 and
the population dynamics x will converge to it. In these two circumstances, (4.16)
evidently holds. If −u+ 2k−1u < λ < u− 2k−1u, then the set of ESSs X ∗ contains
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both 0 and 1 and we need to ascertain which ESS will the population dynamics x
converge to. Recall the evolutionary dynamics of x in (4.15) and we note that if
x > x̃, then ẋ > 0 and x is increasing; if x < x̃, then ẋ < 0 and x is decreasing.
Recall that the initial value of x is x(0) = 0.5. If λ > 0, then x̃ > 0.5 = x(0). So, x
is decreasing initially, which means x will become even smaller and x < x̃ still hods.
Therefore, x is always decreasing and the ESS it converges to is 0. Analogously, if
λ < 0, then the ESS x converges to is 1.
Remark 4.1 Part (ii) of Theorem 4.1 establishes that the steady state of the game-
theoretic social learning method coincides with the decision of the centralized detec-
tor, i.e., the game-theoretic social learning method possesses property P3.
4.4 Numerical Results
In this section, numerical results are presented to corroborate the proposed
game-theoretic social learning approach. We simulate a random regular network
with N = 1000 nodes (agents) and the degree of each node is k = 20. The game
parameters are chosen to be α = 0.05 and u = 0.5. All experimental results are
averages over 100 independent trials.
We first consider a network of I = 2 types of agents. The belief of the first
type is fixed to be p1 = 0.2. We consider two scenarios (i) q1 = q2 = 0.5; (ii)
q1 = 0.3, q2 = 0.7. The relation between the ESS and p2 is reported in Fig. 4.1-
(a) for the two scenarios, respectively. , The ESSs are computed as the average
proportion of agents with decision 0 over the 100 trials. The decisions of the cen-
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tralized detector are also plotted as a benchmark. We observe that the ESSs of the
game-theoretic learning are close to the decisions of the centralized detector in both
scenarios. The gaps between the ESSs of the game-theoretic learning method and
the decisions of the centralized detector are consequences of the randomness of the
graphical evolutionary game formulation (e.g., the birth process in the death-birth
decision update rule is subject to randomness). Note that the theoretical result
(e.g., Theorem 4.1) is based on mean-field approximations, i.e., replacing random
variables with their expectations to simplify analysis. Therefore, though Theorem
4.1 asserts that the steady states of the game-theoretic learning method coincide
with the decisions of the centralized detector, there exist some gaps between the
two in numerical experiments. Since the game-theoretic learning method is fully
distributed and only requires communications of agents’ binary decisions instead of
their real-valued beliefs, it is still more desirable in many applications, especially
those in need of low communication overhead and robustness.
We further conduct experiments for networks with I = 5 types of agents. The
beliefs of the first four types are set to be p1 = 0.6, p2 = 0.7, p3 = 0.5, p4 =
0.4. We consider two scenarios: (i) q1 = q2 = q3 = q4 = q5 = 0.2; (ii) q1 =
0.2, q2 = 0.1, q3 = 0.1, q4 = 0.1, q5 = 0.5. The relation between the ESSs and
p5 is illustrated in Fig. 4.1-(b). The decisions of the centralized detector are also
shown as a comparison. Similar to the experiments with 2 types of agents, the
ESSs of the game-theoretic learning method can still match the decisions of the
centralized detector approximately, which confirms the effectiveness of the proposed
game-theoretic social learning method for different numbers of types.
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game−theoretic learning for scenario 1
centralized detector for scenario 1
game−theoretic learning for scenario 2
centralized detector for scenario 2
(a) Three types of agents














game−theoretic learning for scenario 1
centralized detector for scenario 1
game−theoretic learning for scenario 2
centralized detector for scenario 2
(b) Five types of agents
Fig. 4.1: Performance of the proposed social learning method
The typical number of iterations (or equivalently, time slots) needed to con-
verge to the ESS is between 5 × 104 to 105. Though the iteration number seems
huge, the actual convergence time in real networks is not large given the fact that
the length of each time slot is very small (the length of time slot is approximately
inversely proportional to the number of agents N since one agent is chosen to update
her decision in each time slot).
4.5 Summary
In this letter, a graphical evolutionary game based social learning method
is proposed. The method is fully distributed and only requires communications
of agents’ binary decisions instead of their real-valued beliefs, which endows the
proposed method with low communication complexity. Theoretical analysis under
mean field approximations indicates that the evolutionarily stable states of the game
coincide with the decisions of the centralized detector. Numerical experiments are
implemented to validate the performance of the game-theoretic learning method.
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Chapter 5
Data Trading with Multiple Owners, Collectors and Users: An
Iterative Auction Mechanism
5.1 Motivation
In the big data era, vast amount of data are generated and exploited by vari-
ous agents. For example, numerous memes such as Twitter hashtags are produced
in online social networks and millions of videos are uploaded to Youtube. Many
software/APP developers may need certain online data (such as the click-through
rate of some advertisements or mention count dynamics of some memes) to enhance
the quality of their products. As another example, with the development of data
procurement and storage capability, many organizations own databases of the statis-
tics of their fields, e.g., hospitals may have data about the clinical performances of
medicines. In order to conduct research, researchers need to access these data owned
by organizations. In all these circumstances, we face the problem of allotting/trading
data from the data owners (e.g., social networks/websites or organizations) to the
data users (e.g., software companies or researchers). In fact, several data trading
markets or companies have already emerged recently, such as the Data Marketplace,
Big Data Exchange and Microsoft Azure Marketplace. However, these data markets
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are still at the incipient stage and lack appropriate regulations. Economically, the
data agents are selfish and seek to maximize their own utilities instead of the overall
system efficiency. As such, a sophisticated mechanism is imperative to guide the
agents to distribute or trade data efficiently.
The problem of coordinating data trading in a data market falls into the gen-
eral topic of resource trading/allocation in networks, for which abundant works
have been done in the past decades. For communication networks, by using op-
timization and game theoretic techniques, researchers propose various algorithms
to allocate power [47, 48] or channels [44, 91] to communication nodes or access
points. For cognitive radio networks, spectrum resources are allotted among pri-
mary users and secondary users [52,103]. For power networks or smart grids, power
or voltage resources are distributed to devices and apparatuses in order to maintain
high-performance and stable power systems [36,67,72]. The most relevant resource
allocation/trading problem to this chapter is the privacy trading problem [90]. In
most privacy trading problems investigated in the current literature, a single data
collector is aimed at collecting binary data from multiple data owners in order to
estimate some statistics. From example, each data owner may have a binary answer
(yes/no) to some problem and the data collector wants to estimate the proportion
of data owners with the answer yes. The involved data are private and leakage of
them to the data collector compromises the security of data owners. The loss from
this compromising of privacy can be quantified by the differential privacy [31]. As
such, data owners should be somehow compensated by the data collector. Addi-
tionally, data owners are selfish and may not report their true data to the data
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collector. Therefore, from the perspective of the data collector, a mechanism is
needed to collect accurate data at a low cost from the data owners. To this end,
Ghosh and Roth proposed an auction mechanism for a single data collector to collect
data from multiple data owners [38]. Along this line, Fleischer and Lyu extended
the auction mechanism to the scenario where individual data owner’s valuation of
the data privacy was correlated with the data themselves [35]. Furthermore, Xu et
al. proposed a contract-theoretic mechanism to collect general private data which
are not necessarily binary [112].
However, there are two limitations of existing models of data trading in the
aforementioned works [35, 38, 112]. First, in the existing models, there is only one
single data collector. This is not the case in most real-world data market, where
multiple data collectors (such as many companies or groups like Big Data Exchange)
often coexist and compete with each other. Second, in most data markets, the
data collectors usually do not exploit the data by themselves. Instead, they often
sell the data to data users, who are not capable of collecting and storing massive
datasets but need data to develop projects or conduct research. For example, many
APP developers are small companies who cannot afford collecting necessary data
to develop APPs and thus need to purchase data from professional data collecting
companies. In other words, in data markets, besides data owners and collectors,
there are data users who can make use of the data but are not able to collect
data by themselves. In this chapter, we take the above mentioned two limitations
of existing works into consideration and investigate the data trading problem in a
market with multiple data owners, collectors and users (in the following, we use the
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term data agents to refer to data owners, collectors and users).
Due to the existence of multiple collectors and users, the problem in this
chapter is significantly different from the data trading in [35, 38, 112]. Instead of
maximizing the profit of a single collector as in previous works, we consider from a
system designer’s perspective and are aimed at maximizing the overall social welfare,
which quantifies the operation efficiency of the data market. However, in practice,
the data agents are usually selfish and seek to maximize their own utilities instead of
the overall system performance. In order to coordinate the data trading among mul-
tiple selfish agents, we resort to the iterative auction mechanism, which is initially
proposed in [57]. In iterative auction, the auctioneer announces the resource alloca-
tion and payment rules to the bidders. Then, the selfish bidders submit appropriate
bids to the auctioneer with the goal of maximizing their own utilities. Based on the
submitted bids, the auctioneer adjusts the resource allocation and payment rules
and another round of auction starts. Through careful design of the mechanism, the
iterative auction may converge to an operation point with satisfactory properties.
The iterative auction has already been successfully applied to resource allocation in
communication networks [13,49,50,73].
The contribution of this chapter is epitomized in the following.
• We present a data market model with multiple data owners, collectors and
users who have heterogeneous utility functions. Considering from the per-
spective of the system designer, we formulate corresponding social welfare
maximization problem.
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• An iterative auction mechanism is proposed to coordinate the data trading
among the data agents. The mechanism avoids direct access to the data
agents’ utility functions, which are private information unknown to the system
designer. The selfish nature of individual data agents is also respected in the
mechanism.
• We theoretically show that the proposed mechanism converges to the socially
optimal operation point. We also analytically substantiate that the mechanism
possesses appealing economic properties including individual rationality and
weakly balanced budget.
• We also extend the mechanism to the non-exclusive data trading scenario,
where the same data can be used by multiple data users repeatedly.
• Simulations as well as real data experiments are implemented to validate the
theoretical results of the mechanism.
The roadmap of this chapter is as follows. In Section 5.2, our model of the data
market is presented and the social welfare maximization problem is formulated. In
Section 5.3, we design an iterative auction mechanism to coordinate the data trading.
The convergence analysis and economic properties of the proposed mechanism are
presented in Section 5.4. Then, we extend the mechanism to the non-exclusive data
trading scenario in Section 5.5. In Section 5.6, simulation results and real data
experiments are shown. Lastly, we conclude the paper in Section 5.7.
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Figure 5.1: A data market with multiple data owners, collectors and users
5.2 Model
In this section, we describe the model of a data market with multiple data
owners, collectors and users in detail. Then, we formulate the associated social
welfare maximization problem and motivate the iterative auction mechanism.
Consider a data market with M data owners, N data collectors and L data
users as shown in Fig. 5.1. In real world, the data owners correspond to those sources
or producers of the data such as websites with online user data or organizations with
certain statistics. The data users can be any companies or individuals who either
consume the data or exploit data to develop projects and to make profits. For
example, a software company may need certain user record data to develop an APP.
Often, in a data market, data users do not interact with the data owners directly
due to the limited data collection, storage and processing capability of many data
users. Instead, between data owners and users, there may exist data collectors who
are able to collect, store and process massive datasets.
The collectors collect data from the owners through various methods such as
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web scraping for websites or direct inquiries to organizations with certain statistics.
The specific data collection manner depends on the form of the data. After obtaining
the (massive) data, the collectors store them and further process them to be more
sanitary and user-friendly. Lastly, the collectors sell the data to users according to
the different demands of users.
Different from prior works [35, 38, 112], we assume the existence of multiple
data owners, collectors and users competing with each other, which is the case in
reality as explained in Section 5.1. This makes the problem more challenging because
of the conflicting interests and selfishness of the data agents, which necessitates a
framework different from the traditional auction theoretic approach in [35, 38] and
contract theoretic approach in [112]. Next, we describe the data trading among the
data agents and their utility functions in detail.
5.2.1 Data Owners
Suppose owner m (there are M data owners in total) entitles collector n to
collect xmn amount of data, which is the maximum amount of data that collector
n can get from owner m. For instance, a website may give a data collector (e.g.,
a web scraper) access to a certain part of data in that website; an organization
may allow a data collector to access certain records or statistics of the organization.
Due to the exposure of its data, the owner m suffers a loss of Um(xm), where
xm = [xm1, ..., xmN ]. This loss may stem from compromise of privacy or leakage of
lucrative information/technologies. For example, if a social network allows some of
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its users’ data to be accessed by companies or researchers, its users’ privacy will be
compromised and the social network may lose popularity among online users.
We assume that the data here are exclusive, i.e., the same data can only be
assigned to one collector and one user. For example, software companies (data
users) may need tailored data (e.g., click-through rate of specific web pages or ad-
vertisements in order to monitor the users’ feedback) to develop their own softwares
or APPs. These data are useful only to this user and are useless for others, i.e.,
these data are exclusive. In Section 5.5, we extend the proposed mechanism to
non-exclusive data trading scenario, where the same data can be used by multiple
users.
We assume that owner m has Cm amount of data in total. In real world,
when the data exposure or leakage is tiny, the data owner may hardly suffer any
loss. However, if the data exposure is severe, e.g., larger than a certain threshold,
the privacy loss will increase faster and faster with the amount of data exposure.
In order to capture this second order property of loss function of data owners, we
assume that the loss function Um is a convex function.
5.2.2 Data Collectors
Suppose collector n (there are N data collectors in total) collects ymn data
from owner m. Clearly, ymn is no larger than xmn. When it is strictly smaller than
xmn, the collector n does not collect all the authorized data from owner m due to the
loss from collection efforts. We assume that the collecting procedure incurs a loss
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of Vn(yn) for collector n, where yn = [y1n, ..., yMn]
T . In real world, the collecting
procedure can be data scraping from websites or direct inquiry to organizations
etc., depending on the form and availability of the data. The collection and basic
trimming/processing of the massive data need significant efforts of the collectors.
In addition, the storage of the massive datasets also necessitate lots of apparatuses
and devices. All of these contribute to the loss of the data collectors. Often, with
the increase of the data to be collected, the difficulty (and hence efforts) of data
collection increases faster and faster due to reasons such as the limitations on the
internet connections and computers’ processing speed (if the data amount is huge,
collectors need to greatly enhance their internet connections or computer devices,
which is costly). Therefore, we assume Vn is a convex function.
5.2.3 Data Users
Lastly, data user l (there are L data users in total) buys znl amount of data
from collector n. The gain of user l is Wl(zl), where zl = [z1l, ..., zNl]
T . For instance,
by exploiting the user feedback data such as click-through rate, a software/APP
developer can enhance its product and makes more profits. As per conventions of
the resource allocation literature, the gain function Wl is assumed to be a concave
function.
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5.2.4 Social Welfare Maximization
As the interests of the data agents conflict with each other (e.g., the data
owners want to sell the data with high price while the data collector wants to gain
the data at low cost) and the data agents are selfish, a system designer is needed
to coordinate the agents’ behaviors to maximize overall system efficiency or social
welfare, which is defined as the difference between the total gain of users and total
loss of owners and collectors. The corresponding social welfare maximization problem
SWM can be formulated as follows.




















ymn ≤ xmn, ∀m,n. (5.4)
The first constraint is the total data constraint at each data owner. The second
constraint is the data constraint at each collector where the total amount of sold
data is no larger than the amount of total collected data. The third constraint
means that the data collected by a collector n from an owner m is no bigger than
the data that owner m entitles collector n to collect.
SWM is a convex optimization problem and can be solved in a centralized
manner by using state-of-the-art optimization toolbox such as CVX [11]. However, in
real-world applications, we cannot directly solve the SWM to coordinate the data
trading due to the following reasons.
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• First, data agents (data owners, collectors and users) are selfish and seek to
maximize their own utilities instead of the social welfare. As a result, even if
the system designer computes the socially optimal point by solving SWM, the
optimal solution cannot be enforced given the selfishness of the data agents.
• Second, the utility functions U, V,W are private information of the agents
which is unknown to the system designer. Thereby, SWM cannot be solved
at the system designer’s side in a centralized fashion.
In order to elicit the private information of the agents and guide the selfish
agents to cooperate to achieve social optimum, we resort to iterative auction mech-
anism [57]. The presumption of this mechanism is that the agents are price-takers,
meaning that the each agent takes the announced prices as fixed and does not expect
any impact of its action on the prices. This hypothesis holds when either (1) the
agents have limited computational capability and thus limited rationality so that
they do not consider the effects of their actions on pricing; or (2) the number of
agents is large so that each agent has little influence on the prices.
5.3 Mechanism Design
In this section, we design an iterative auction mechanism for the data trading
problem formulated in Section 5.2. Our design goal is to guide the selfish agents to
trade data at a socially optimal point while respecting each agent’s private infor-
mation, i.e., avoiding direct inquiry of the agents’ utility functions. The proposed
iterative auction mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 5.2. The system designer serves
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as the auctioneer and the data agents are the bidders. Analogous to many auction
mechanisms in the literature [62], the agents submit bids to signal their valuations
of the resources, or data in this context. The first step of the mechanism is that
the system designer announces the data allocation and pricing/reimbursement rules
to the agents. In the second step, based on these rules, each agent calculates and
submits an appropriate bid in order to maximize her own utility in accordance with
her selfishness. In the third step, the system designer computes the data allocation
result according to the submitted bids and the data allocation rule. The aforemen-
tioned three steps are common in auction theory. The unique feature of iterative
auction lies in the fourth step, in which the system designer adjusts the data allo-
cation and pricing/reimbursement rules based on the data allocation results. Then,
the system designer announces these new rules and another auction begins. This
iterative process continues until the system designer observes convergence. In the
following subsections, we describe each step of the mechanism in more detail.
5.3.1 The System Designer’s Problem
As explained in Section 5.2, a difficulty for the system designer to solve the
SWM is that the she is unaware of the loss and gain functions U, V,W , which
are private information of the agents. Thus, the system designer has to replace
these unknown functions with some known functions. In addition, denote the bid
that owner m submits to the system designer by sm = [sm1, ..., smN ]  0, where





     Auctioneer
(System Designer)
Figure 5.2: An illustration of the proposed iterative auction mechanism, which
iterates the four steps depicted in the figure.
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tn = [t1n, ..., tMn]
T  0 and the bid of user l by rl = [r1l, ..., rNl]T  0. The bids
signal the agents’ valuations of the data and should be incorporated into the loss
and gain functions in the system designer’s perspective. In the iterative auction
mechanism, the system designer makes the following utility function replacements
















rnl log znl. (5.7)
Note that through these replacements, the convexity/concavity of the functions






















s.t. the constraints (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4) (5.9)
Denote the dual variables associated with constraints (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4) by






























































ymn ≤ xmn, ∀m,n, (5.13)
Dual Feasibility : λ  0, µ  0, η  0, (5.14)

















ηmn(ymn − xmn) = 0, (5.17)
Stationarity : smnxmn + λm − ηmn = 0, ∀m,n, (5.18)
tmnymn − µn + ηmn = 0,∀m,n, (5.19)
−rnl
znl
+ µn = 0, ∀n, l. (5.20)










, ∀m,n, l. (5.21)
The data allocation rule prescribes how the data are allocated given the submitted
bids S = [smn]M×N ,T = [tmn]M×N ,R = [rnl]N×L. The allocation rule is parameter-
ized by the Lagrangian multipliers λ,µ,η. Given a set of {λ,µ,η}, an allocation
rule is defined according to Eq. (5.21), i.e., a relationship between the data alloca-
tion and the bids is specified. As stated in the first step of the mechanism in Fig.
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5.2, besides data allocation rule, the system designer also needs to specify the data
pricing/reimbursement rule, i.e., the price and reimbursement of data as functions
of the bids of the agents. In other words, for owner m, given its bid sm, the system
designer needs to reimburse fm(sm) amount of money to compensate her loss due to
privacy compromise. Similarly, the system designer will reimburse gn(tn) amount
of money to collector n given her bid tn. Furthermore, the system designer will
charge user l hl(rl) amount of money given her bid rl. As a mechanism designer,
we need to appropriately design the pricing/reimbursement functions fm, gn, hl so
that the data allocation will gradually converge to the socially optimal point, i.e.,
the optimal point of SWM. In the following subsections, we specify how to design
these pricing/reimbursement functions in detail.
5.3.2 Owners’ Problems
For owner m, if she bids sm, she will get an reimbursement of fm(sm) as well







, according to the data allocation rule in Eq.



















In order to design a suitable fm such that the data allocation will converge to the
socially optimal point, we need to compare Eq. (5.23) with the optimality condition
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The constraints of SWM and DAP are the same and the only difference is the
objective function. Thus, in the KKT conditions of SWM, the primal feasibility,
dual feasibility and complementary slackness conditions are the same as those of
DAP, i.e., equations (5.11)-(5.17), while stationarity condition of SWM is:
∂Um(xm)
∂xmn
+ λm − ηmn = 0, ∀m,n, (5.25)
Vn(yn)
∂ymn
− µn + ηmn = 0, ∀m,n, (5.26)
−Wl(zl)
znl
+ µn = 0, ∀n, l. (5.27)

















































= 0, ∀m. (5.30)
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Thus, the utility maximization problem of user l is:





























· µn = 1. (5.34)
Thus, we design the price function of user l to be hl(rl) =
∑N
n=1 rnl.
5.3.5 Summary of Algorithm
The owners’ problem (5.22), the collectors’ problem (5.29) and the users’ prob-
lem (5.32) together specify how the bids are chosen in the second stage of the mech-
anism in Fig. 5.2. Then, in the third stage, the system designer computes the
new data allocation result based on these submitted bids and the data allocation
rule in Eq. (5.21). In the fourth stage, we update the dual variables λ,µ,η (or
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equivalently, update the data allocation rule and data pricing/reimbursement rule)






















ηmn ← (µmn + α(ymn − xmn))+,∀m,n, (5.37)
where α > 0 is the step length and x+ = max{x, 0}. The proposed iterative auction
mechanism is summarized in Algorithm 5.1. We remark that Algorithm 5.1 is a
distributed algorithm: each data agent solves its own utility maximization prob-
lem in a parallel manner and the interactions between the agents. Algorithm 5.1
clearly resolves the two difficulties for directly solving SWM in Subsection 5.2-D:
(i) each agent maximizes her own utility in accordance with her selfishness; (ii) the
system designer does not direct access the private information of the agents, i.e., the
loss/gain functions U, V,W . Instead the system designer gradually and implicitly
elicits this information through iterative auctions.
5.4 Convergence and Economic Properties of the Mechanism
In this section, we theoretically show that the proposed iterative auction mech-
anism for data trading can indeed converge to the socially optimal operating point,
i.e., the optimal point of SWM. Moreover, we prove that the mechanism has two
appealing economic properties, i.e., individual rationality and weakly balanced bud-
get, which makes the mechanism economically viable.
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Algorithm 5.1: The proposed iterative auction mechanism
1: Initialize X(0),Y(0),Z(0),λ(0),µ(0),η(0) to be non-negative. Set the time index
τ to be 0.
2: Repeat the following until convergence:
3: The system designer announces λ(τ),µ(τ),η(τ).
4: τ ← τ + 1.
5: Each owner m solves its problem (5.22) to get s
(τ)
m .
6: Each collector n solves its problem (5.29) to get t
(τ)
n .
7: Each user l solves its problem (5.32) to get r
(τ)
l .
8: The system designer computes the new X(τ),Y(τ),Z(τ) according to the
current allocation rule (5.21) and the submitted bids S(τ), T(τ) and R(τ).

































When designing the mechanism in Section 5.3, we make a connection between
the data allocation rule, the optimality condition of each agent’s utility maximization
problem and the KKT conditions of SWM. Intuitively, the mechanism should guide
the data allocation towards the solution of SWM. In this subsection, we rigorously
demonstrate this convergence result. To make the analysis tractable, we assume
that the step size α in the update of dual variables (5.38), (5.39) and (5.40) is very
small, which is a reasonable assumption in the literature of subgradient method
in optimization theory [10] and LMS algorithm in adaptive signal processing [45].
Thus, we can approximate Algorithm 5.1 with a continuous-time version by taking
the time slot to be α. From Eq. (5.38), we know that λm is always non-negative. If
λ
(τ−1)
m > 0, since α is very small, the quantity inside the parenthesis of Eq. (5.38) is










. Noting that the time slot




n=1 xmn −Cm. If λ
(τ−1)
m = 0,




n=1 xmn − Cm
)+
. Define the notation (for
x, y ∈ R and y ≥ 0):
(x)+y =

x, if y > 0,






























= (ymn − xmn)+ηmn . (5.44)
Now, we are ready to state the convergence result.
Theorem 5.1 Suppose the step size α in Algorithm 5.1 is small enough. Then, the
data allocation (X,Y,Z) of Algorithm 5.1 converges to the optimal point of SWM.
Moreover, the dual variables (λ,µ,η) of Algorithm 5.1 converge to the dual optimal
point of SWM.



































































































(ηmn − η∗mn)(ymn − xmn), (5.48)
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where we use equations (5.42), (5.43) and (5.44) to get Eq. (5.47). The rea-
son of inequality (5.48) is as follows. If λm = 0, then
(∑N








n=1 xmn − Cm. Since λm − λ∗m = −λ∗m ≤ 0, we have
(λm − λ∗m)
(∑N
n=1 xmn − Cm
)+
λm
≤ (λm − λ∗m)
(∑N
n=1 xmn − Cm
)
. If If λm > 0, we
evidently have (λm− λ∗m)
(∑N





n=1 xmn − Cm
)
. In
all, we always have (λm−λ∗m)
(∑N





n=1 xmn − Cm
)
and similar inequalities hold for the other two terms in (5.47), leading to inequality
(5.48). In Step 5, the optimal point of the problem (5.22) should satisfy the opti-
mality condition (5.23). Noting the form of the reimbursement function f we design















Similarly, from the optimality condition (5.30), we get









Denote the optimal point of SWM by (X∗,Y∗,Z∗). Since SWM is a convex opti-
mization problem, KKT condition is necessary and sufficient for optimality. Hence,
the primal optimal point (X∗,Y∗,Z∗) together with dual optimal point (λ∗,µ∗,η∗)
125
















































































































































































Moreover, since the primal optimal point (X∗,Y∗,Z∗) together with dual optimal
point (λ∗,µ∗,η∗) should satisfy the KKT conditions of SWM, including conditions
(5.11)-(5.17) (this part of KKT conditions coincides with that of DAP), from the




















mn − x∗mn) = 0. (5.63)































(ηmn − η∗mn)(y∗mn − x∗mn) ≤ 0. (5.66)
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The last inequality of (5.67) is due to the convexity/concavity of the functions
U, V,W . Specifically, since Um, Vn are convex functions and Wl is concave function,
we have:
(∇Um(x∗m)−∇Um(xm))
T (x∗m − xm) ≥ 0, ∀m, (5.68)
(∇Wl(zl)−∇Wl(z∗l ))
T (zl − z∗l ) ≤ 0, ∀l, (5.69)
(∇Vn(yn)−∇Vn(y∗n))
T (yn − y∗n) ≥ 0,∀n. (5.70)
Adding inequalities (5.68), (5.69) and (5.70) together over all m,n, l yields the last
inequality of (5.67). Combining the inequalities (5.48) and (5.67), we obtain dH
dτ
≤
0. Thus, according to LaSalle’s invariance principle [59], (λ,µ,η) converges to
(λ∗,µ∗,η∗). Comparing equations (5.50), (5.51) and (5.52) with equations (5.53),
(5.54) and (5.55), we conclude that (X,Y,Z) converges to (X∗,Y∗,Z∗).
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5.4.2 Economic Properties
Implementation of the proposed iterative auction mechanism in real-world
data trading market necessitates brilliant economic properties of the mechanism.
In this subsection, we show that the proposed mechanism has appealing economic
properties. First, the proposed mechanism is clearly efficient since it converges to
the socially optimal point. Second, the proposed mechanism possesses the incentive
compatibility property because in each auction iteration, each agent is maximizing
her own utility selfishly. To ensure that each agent complies to the mechanism
voluntarily, the mechanism needs to guarantee that every agent has non-negative
utility, i.e., the mechanism should be individually rational. This is shown in the
following proposition.
Proposition 5.1 Assume that Um(0) = 0, Vn(0) = 0,Wl(0) = 0,∀m,n, l. Then,
when Algorithm 5.1 converges, every data agent has non-negative utility, i.e., the
proposed mechanism is individually rational.
Proof: As shown in Theorem 5.1, when Algorithm 5.1 converges, (X,Y,Z)
becomes (X∗,Y∗,Z∗) and (λ,µ,η) becomes (λ∗,µ∗,η∗). Thus, according to the















Since Um is convex, we have:
0 = Um(0) ≥ Um(x∗m) +∇Um(x∗m)T (0− x∗m), (5.74)







x∗mn − Um(x∗m) ≥ 0. (5.75)
By Eq. (5.53), we further derive:
N∑
n=1
(η∗mn − λ∗m)x∗mn − Um(x∗m) ≥ 0, (5.76)





− Um(x∗m) ≥ 0. (5.77)
Note that the left hand side is exactly the utility of owner m when Algorithm 5.1


















− Vn(y∗n) ≥ 0. (5.79)
Notice that the left hand side is just the utility of collector n when Algorithm 5.1
converges. We thus assert that each collector has non-negative utility. From the



















l ) ≥ 0. (5.81)
Hence, each user has non-negative utility. Overall, we conclude that the mechanism
is individually rational.
We can further show that the system designer has weakly balanced budget, i.e., the
income (through the data reimbursement/pricing) of the system designer in the
mechanism is non-negative when Algorithm 5.1 converges. In other words, the
system designer does not need to inject any money into the data market in order to
implement the mechanism.
Proposition 5.2 When Algorithm 5.1 converges, the income of the system designer
through data reimbursement/pricing in the mechanism is non-negative. In other
words, the mechanism has weakly balanced budget.























































































where Eq. (5.84) comes from equations (5.71), (5.72) and (5.73). The reason of the
last step is: η∗mn(y
∗










= 0 due to complimen-
tary slackness (5.62) and (5.63) and x∗mn ≥ 0, λ∗m ≥ 0.
5.5 Extension to Non-Exclusive Data Trading
In previous sections, we assume that the data are exclusive, i.e., the same data
can be dispensed to only one user and one collector. However, in many real-world
data markets, the data can be non-exclusive, i.e., the same data can be allotted to
multiple collectors and users. For example, many software/APP developers (data
users) may want to access the same online data of some social network (data owner);
or many researchers (data users) may want to use the same data from an organization
(data owner) to conduct research. In this section, we formulate the data trading
problem with non-exclusive data and extend the proposed mechanism in Section 5.3
to this scenario.
Since the same data can be distributed to multiple collectors, different collec-
tors’ data can overlap each other. To avoid purchasing the same data from different
collectors, we assume that each user buys data from only one single collector. Equiv-
alently, from the collectors’ perspective, each collector n serves a set of users Ln and
users in Ln only purchase data from collector n. For example, in real world, a data
collection company may occupy the most of the share of the local market in some
region and becomes the monopoly in the local region. Basically all data users in
this region will purchase data only from this data collector. Note that the sets
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Ln, n = 1, ..., N are mutually exclusive and
⋃N
n=1 Ln = {1, ..., L}. Each user l pur-
chases from its designated collector zml amount owner m’s data. Other notations
are the same as the exclusive data trading model in Section 5.2. The social welfare











s.t. ymn ≤ xmn, ∀m,n, (5.88)
xmn ≤ Cm, ∀m,n, (5.89)
zml ≤ ymn, ∀m,n, l ∈ Ln. (5.90)
The first constraint means that the data collected by collectors should be
no more than the data authorized by the owners. The second constraint is the
data constraint at each owner. Instead of total data constraint in the exclusive
data trading scenario, the data constraint becomes individual data constraint in the
non-exclusive data trading scenario. The third constraint indicates that the data
purchased by users are no greater than the data collected by collectors. Similar to
the exclusive data trading scenario, it is inviable to directly solve this social wel-
fare maximization problem and enforce the solution for the data agents. Hence,
we go through similar procedures as in Section 5.3 to obtain an iterative auction
mechanism which can achieve the social optimum while respecting agents’ private
information (their loss/gain functions) and selfishness. The mechanism is summa-
rized in Algorithm 5.2 and the design details are omitted. In Algorithm 5.2, we
denote the Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to constraints (5.88), (5.89) and
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(5.90) by µ ∈ RM×N ,λ ∈ RM×N and η ∈ RM×L, respectively.
5.6 Simulations and Real Data Experiments
In this section, we present simulations as well as real data experiments to
validate the theoretical results for the proposed iterative auction mechanism. We
consider both exclusive data trading and non-exclusive data trading.
5.6.1 Simulations
Consider a data market with M = 2 data owners, N = 2 data collectors and
L = 4 data users. The total data amount of owners 1 and 2 are set to be 2 and 4,







, m = 1, 2, (5.100)




y2mn, n = 1, 2, (5.101)


















We first consider the exclusive data trading scenario. We simulate the pro-
posed iterative auction mechanism in Algorithm 5.1. In Fig. 5.3, we validate the
convergence behavior of the mechanism. The relative error used in Fig. 5.3 is
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Algorithm 5.2: The iterative auction mechanism for non-exclusive data trad-
ing
1: Initialize X(0),Y(0),Z(0),λ(0),µ(0),η(0) to be non-negative. Set the time index τ to be 0.
2: Repeat the following until convergence:
3: The system designer announces λ(τ),µ(τ),η(τ).
4: τ ← τ + 1.










































































































































,∀m,n, l ∈ Ln. (5.99)
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Figure 5.3: Convergence of the iterative auction mechanism to the socially optimal












, where || · ||F means the Frobenius norm. As
guaranteed by Theorem 5.1, the mechanism converges to the socially optimal point,
i.e., the mechanism is efficient. We further investigate the economic properties of
the mechanism through simulations in Fig. 5.4. We report the utilities of the owner
1, collector 1 and user 1 as the algorithm gradually converges. As asserted in Propo-
sition 5.1, the mechanism is individually rational: the three data agents in Fig. 5.4
have non-negative utilities when the algorithm converges. Furthermore, we show the
budget balance (income) of the system designer and find that as assured by Propo-
sition 5.2, the budget balance is non-negative when the algorithm converges. Next,
we turn to the non-exclusive data trading scenario. We set L1 = {1, 2},L2 = {3, 4}.
Other simulation setup remains unchanged and we simulate the iterative auction
mechanism in Algorithm 5.2. As exhibited in Fig. 5.5, the mechanism still con-
verges to the socially optimal point.
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 Utility of owner 1
Utility of collector 1
Utility of user 1
Budget balance of the system designer
Figure 5.4: The utilities of owner 1, collector 1 and user 1 and the budget balance
(income) of the system designer.































   






















Figure 5.5: Convergence of the iterative auction mechanism to the socially optimal
point: non-exclusive data trading.
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(a) Wealth score data price: y =
0.821x0.9131













(b) Text analytics data price: y =
1.267x0.5329
Fig. 5.6: Fitting the real-world data price
5.6.2 Real Data Experiments
In this subsection, we use real data to get the loss/gain functions of the data
agents and investigate the performance of the proposed mechanism on them. We
still consider a data market with M = 2 owners, N = 2 collectors and L = 4 users.
We first use real data prices to estimate the users’ gain functions. To this end,
we fit the prices of the two datasets, namely the wealth score dataset and the text
analytics dataset, in the Microsoft Azure Marketplace [1] (a data trading platform)
with the function y = axb. The fitting results are shown in Fig. 5.6, which are very
accurate. The sum of these two price functions can be regarded as the mean user
gain function. To introduce heterogeneity into users’ gain functions, we multiple a








nl , l = 1, 2, 3, 4 (5.103)
where α1 = 0.821, α2 = 1.267, β1 = 0.9131, β2 = 0.5329, c
′
1 = 1/2, c
′
2 = 5/6, c
′
3 =
7/6, c′4 = 3/2.
Next, we estimate the owners’ loss functions. In [112], a relationship between
the information loss and the privacy breach level in anonymization is obtained from
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real data [3]. Specifically, the privacy leakage is quantified by the k-anonymity,
which means that the probability that an individual item being re-identified by an
attacker is no higher than 1/k. Thus, 1/k can be regarded as the loss of the data
owner. (total data amount − IL) can be regarded as the effective amount of data
obtained by a collector, where IL means the information loss. The relationship
between k and IL is estimated to be IL = −0.4804k−0.2789 + 0.7883, which can
be rewritten as 1/k = (2.0816(0.7883 − IL))3.5855. We set 0.7883 to be the total
amount of data and thus y = (2.0816x)3.5855 can be regarded as the average owners’
loss function. By varying the coefficients, we introduce heterogeneity to the loss







3.5855, m = 1, 2, (5.104)
where θ1 = 1.5816, θ2 = 2.5816, a
′
1 = 5, a
′
2 = 15. As for the collectors’ loss functions
Vn, it is hard to find corresponding real data and we directly use quadratic functions
in simulation setups for them. Other experiment setups are the same as those of
simulations.
With the loss/gain functions estimated from real data, we test the perfor-
mance of the proposed iterative auction mechanism. We first consider the exclusive
data trading. The total data amounts of owner 1 and owner 2 are 0.25 and 0.5,
respectively. As shown in Fig. 5.7, the mechanism still converges to the socially
optimal point. In Fig. 5.8, we further observe that the individual rationality and
weakly balanced budget still hold as the utilities of owner 1, collector 1 and user 1
as well as the budget balance of the system designer are all non-negative. Then, we
139





























   
   
   
   
























Figure 5.7: Convergence of the iterative auction mechanism to the socially optimal
point in real data experiment.
change to the non-exclusive data trading and alter the total data amounts of owner
1 and owner 2 to be 0.2 and 0.4, respectively. We remark that the mechanism still
converges to the socially optimal point, as illustrated in Fig. 5.9.
Lastly, we endeavor to compare the proposed iterative auction mechanism with
the contract-theoretic approach in [112]. The model of [112] consists of multiple
data owners and one single data collector without the notion of data users. To
accommodate to this, we consider M = 4 owners, N = 1 collector and L = 1 user





3.5855, m = 1, 2, 3, 4, (5.105)








, a′′4 = 15. The total data amount of each owner is
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Utility of owner 1
Utility of collector 1
Utility of user 1
Budget balance of the system designer
Figure 5.8: The utilities of owner 1, collector 1 and user 1 and the budget balance
(income) of the system designer in real data experiment.



























   
   
   
   
























Figure 5.9: Convergence of the iterative auction mechanism to the socially optimal
point in real data experiment: non-exclusive data trading.
141




The loss function of the single data collector still takes the quadratic form previously




Ty1. Since the model in [112] only considers linear owner
loss, we use Ũm(xm) = 2.0816a
′′
mxm for [112]. Besides, the model in [112] sets the
collector’s gain to be a square root function. Hence, we use W̃1(z1) = 0.82105z
0.5
1 for
[112]. Note that the collector in [112] plays the role of end user and we translates that
into the user in our model. In the model of [112], we need to specify a required total
amount of data, i.e., qreq =
∑M
m=1 xm, which we set to be 0.16, i.e., the half of the
sum of total data amounts of all the owners. We first simulate the proposed iterative
auction mechanism, which still converges to the socially optimal point, as illustrated
in Fig. 5.10. The socially optimal point is X = Y = [0.08, 0.08, 0.074, 0.074]T , Z =
0.3015 and the optimal social welfare (which is obtained by the proposed mechanism)
is 0.373. Then, we simulate the contract-theoretic approach of [112], which gives
the data allocation X = Y = [0.080.0800]T , Z = 0.16 and a social welfare of 0.2812.
Thus, we observe that the proposed mechanism can achieve a higher social welfare
than [112].
According to the experiments and simulations, a practical issue of the pro-
posed iterative auction mechanism is that it may need hundreds of iterations to
converge. This requires the bidders (agents) to bid for hundreds of times. A com-
mon solution to this issue is to equip each bidder with some bidding software, which
can automatically bid for the agent according to some preset bidding rule such as
142



























   






















Figure 5.10: Convergence of the iterative auction mechanism to the socially optimal
point in the comparison experiment.
the one specified in the proposed iterative auction mechanism. With the help of
such bidding softwares, the bidding processes can be very fast and accomplish hun-
dreds of iterations quickly, making the proposed mechanism practical. In fact, fast
iterative bidding with the assist of bidding softwares is already used in practice such
as the eBay auction.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we study the data trading problem with multiple data owners,
collectors and users. We present an iterative auction mechanism to guide the selfish
agents to behave in a socially optimal way without direct access of their private
information. We theoretically prove the convergence as well as economic properties
(individual rationality and weakly balanced budget) of the mechanism. Simulations





Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, we have presented several game-theoretic analyses of user
behaviors in social systems. We have also designed an efficient data trading mech-
anism for data markets with multiple data agents. These works shed some light on
the fundamentals of the comprehension, design and optimization of modern social
networks, data markets or more generally, multi-agent systems.
First, we study the information propagation problem in heterogeneous social
networks composed of users with different hobbies and influences or more abstractly,
types. Two distinct network scenarios are considered, namely the unknown user type
model and the known user type model, depending on whether users know the types
of their neighbors. Modeling users’ learning and decision-making processes as a
graphical evolutionary game, we theoretically derive the evolutionary dynamics and
the evolutionarily stable states (ESSs) of the information diffusion game. Numerical
experiments based on both synthetic data and real-world information dessemination
data are presented to confirm the validity of the proposed game-theoretic models
for information diffusion.
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Second, incorporating the notion of long-term incentives of users, we propose
a novel sequential game theoretic model for users’ decision making procedure in the
formation of generic popularity dynamics, e.g., information diffusion dynamics and
paper citation dynamics. The existence and uniqueness of the symmetric Nash equi-
librium (SNE) of the game are proved. First and second order properties of the SNE
are demonstrated, confirming our empirical observations from real-world popularity
dynamics. Furthermore, the game-theoretic model and analysis are corroborated
by fitting and prediction experiments based on real-world information propagation
data and paper citation data.
Third, we examine the social learning problem, in which networked agents
collaborate to detect some unknown state of the nature, which can be the quality
of some products or services in recommendation systems in practice. A distributed
evolutionary game theoretic learning algorithm is proposed and each agent only
needs to communicate its binary action with its neighbors, making the algorithm
computationally efficient. Theoretical analysis manifests that the ESS of the game
coincides with the decision of a fictitious centralized detector, highlighting the op-
timality of the proposed learning algorithm.
Finally, we investigate the data trading problem in data markets with mul-
tiple data owners, collectors and users. An iterative auction based data trading
mechanism is proposed to guide the selfish agents to trade data efficiently with-
out direct access their private information. The proposed mechanism is shown to
converge to the socially optimal operation point and has appealing economic proper-
ties including individual rationality and weakly balanced budget. Additionally, the
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mechanism is validated through numerical experiments based on real-world data
prices from Microsoft Azure Marketplace, an emerging data trading market.
This dissertation has broad applications in multi-agent systems with intelli-
gent users and modern data trading platforms. Firstly, the proposed game-theoretic
frameworks deepen our comprehension of social network users’ behaviors. With
the presented game-theoretic analysis, we can go one step further to design smart
mechanisms to guide users to behave in a certain way. For instance, we may
give online users appropriate virtual badges or virtual coins to alter their utility
functions and thus influence the outcomes (or equilibria of the games) of users’
interactions/decision-making. This can be used to incentivize users to adopt certain
behaviors that we desire. In fact, some simple incentive mechanisms have already
been implemented in several successful real-world social websites, e.g., Stack Over-
flow (a popular Q&A website), where virtual badges and sophisticated rating mech-
anisms are used to incentivize users to raise meaningful questions and to provide
high quality answers. Secondly, the iterative auction based data trading mechanism
proposed in this dissertation can be applied to real-world data trading systems as a
novel trading paradigm in contrast to the traditional fixed price trading scheme used
in most existing data trading platforms such as Microsoft Azure Marketplace. While
respecting the selfishness and privacy concerns of data agents, the proposed mecha-
nism guarantees overal system efficiency, which cannot be achieved by existing data
trading methods. Actually, in practice, some simple auction mechanisms have al-
ready been used in electronic trading platforms (e.g., eBay Auction) for goods other
than data, indicating the promising prospect of auction based trading schemes.
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6.2 Future Work
In this section, I point out two potential future research directions, namely
signal processing for social networks and data trading beyond our existing work in
Chapter 5.
6.2.1 Signal Processing for Social Networks
The first three works in this dissertation, i.e., Chapters 2, 3, 4, are focused on
game-theoretic analysis for social network users’ behaviors. One commmon implicit
assumption made in most game-theoretic works is that the players should be rational
so that the various solution concepts of the game, e.g., Nash equilibrium, subgame
perfect equilibrium, evolutionarily stable states, can hold in practice. Sometimes,
this rationality hypothesis is overly restrictive as many practical agents are not fully
rational due to factors such as limited computational capability. For instance, a
social network user may not make the best response with respect to her neighbors’
actions because calculation of such best response consumes too much efforts for
the user. Consequently, though game theory is a powerful tool to give insightful
explanations of the underlying mechanisms of many social phenomena, it is not
suitable for those data driven tasks such as statistical inference, estimation and
detection (or at least, one cannot solely rely on game theory for those tasks). This
limitation motivates me to pursue a more data-centric approach for problems in
social networks by invoking tools from signal processing, pattern recognition and
optimization theory in the future.
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In fact, there are plenty of emerging well-posed signal processing problems in
social networks or more generally, network science. For instance, researchers often
encounter the so called topology inference problem in network science [5, 96], e.g.,
inferring an influence graph of social entities from the observed social events and
inferring a brain connection network from the available brain signals. Generally
speaking, in topology inference, we are given some data or signals over a network
and our goal is to estimate the underlying network topology. To some extent, the
topology inference problem can be regarded as the opposite of classical distributed
signal processing problems, in which we are given the network topology and our goal
is to process the signals over the network.
Another example of signal processing in social networks is cascade track-
ing [5, 6]. When a piece of information propagates over social networks, it gen-
erates a path of information dissemination, which is called information cascade. For
instance, an information cascade of A → B → {C,D} means that the information
propagates from A to B and later from B to C and D. Information cascades are im-
portant for many applications such as identification of critical/influential users in
social networks. Unfortunately, in practice, information cascades are often not di-
rectly observable since users usually do not identify who influences whom in social
networks. Therefore, we have to apply statistical signal processing techniques to
infer the hidden information cascades from the available data such as timestamps of
infections, e.g., mentioning a certain phrase or purchasing a certain product. Other
network signal processing issues encompass community detection, signal recovery
and signal sampling over graphs, etc [4, 19–22,74,92,93].
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6.2.2 Data Trading: Quantity versus Quality
In Chapter 5, we design an efficient data trading scheme for data markets with
multiple data agents. As more and more data are desired by more and more individu-
als and companies to perform various data analytics for either research or businesses,
it is foreseeable that data trading will become more important in the future and de-
serves more research efforts. Actually, besides our work in [15], i.e., Chapter 5 of
this dissertation, there have been several research efforts on data trading in recent
years [107,112,115,117,118]. Hitherto, most works on data trading are either solely
focused on the quantity aspect of the data [15, 115, 117] or merely concentrated on
the quality aspect of the data (e.g., privacy concerns of data providers) [107, 112],
yet no joint consideration of both quantity and quality of the data exists in the
literature.
Therefore, in the future, I am motivated to investigate the quantity and quality
aspects of the data jointly in the data trading problems. The goal of this research is
twofold. The first goal is to steer the data markets to trade an appropriate quantity
of data among the data agents subject to their selfishness and privacy constraints.
The appropriateness here is measured from the perspective of either social welfare
or the profits of certain parties of the data market. The second goal is to incentivize
the data providers to offer high quality data by designing an intellegient incentive
mechanism. This goal will promote the reliability of data and is particularly crucial
for modern data acquisition methods such as crowdsourcing, which, though being
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